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INTRODUCTION
Charter schools are the fastest growing form of public education in
the United States.
Since the first charter school opened in
Minneapolis, St. Paul in 1992, the charter school movement has grown
to include forty-two states and the District of Columbia, 1 with over
6,004 charter schools educating 2.2 million students. 2 While school
choice measures, such as vouchers and education tax credits, are often
hotly debated, 3 the dramatic growth of charter schools over the past
twenty-six years reflects a bipartisan acceptance of charter schools as

1. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICA’S CHARTER
SCHOOLS 2014 5 (Ted Rebarber & Alison C. Zgainer eds., 2014) [hereinafter
ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICA’S CHARTER SCHOOLS].
2. Id.
3. See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School
Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2063–85 (2002); Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and
States’ Duty to Support “Public” Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV. 909, 910–11 (2007). School
choice programs permit parents to choose among a variety of non-tuition options if
they are unsatisfied with the performance of their district public school. See Brian P.
Marron, The Final Reform: A Centrist Vision of School Choice, 8 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 321, 327 (2001).
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a viable and successful method for education reform in the United
States. 4
Notwithstanding this bipartisan support, there remains a powerful
barrier to charter school formation and success: inequitable funding
between charter schools and traditional public school. 5 The Center
for Education Reform reports that charter schools receive on average
roughly thirty percent less funding than local public schools. 6 In a
2005 report titled Inequity’s Next Frontier, the Thomas B. Fordham
Foundation found that charter schools in twenty-six out of twentyseven communities received between $1,000 to $5,000 less per pupil
than district-run public schools. 7 This funding disparity continued
following the economic recession of 2007–2008, reaching roughly
$4,352 per pupil in 2011. 8 Coalitions of charter schools in several
states have successfully sued local school districts under state
education finance laws for inequitable distribution of federal and
state funds. 9 Recent commentators also suggest that charter schools
may have a claim under state constitutional “education clauses” 10 and
the federal Equal Protection Clause. 11

4. During National Charter School Week, Presidents of the United States, from
Presidents Clinton to Trump, have annually recognized the key role that charter
schools play in empowering parents and systemically reforming education. See Press
Release, President George W. Bush, National Charter Schools Week 2008 (May 2,
2008), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/05/2008050210.html [https://perma.cc/ADE7-XVD6]; Proclamation 7297, President William J.
Clinton,
National
Charter
Schools
Week
2000
(Apr.
28,
2000),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-7297-national-charterschools-week-2000 [https://perma.cc/3E62-4VAD]. In addition, through the 2008
presidential campaign, President Obama declared his support for expanding funding
for charter schools. See David J. Hoff, Obama Elected 44th President, EDUC. WK.
(Nov. 4, 2008), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/11/05/12obama.h28.html
[https://perma.cc/49DC-NQLX].
5. See generally CHESTER E. FINN, JR. ET AL., THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST.,
CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING: INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER 1 (2005) [hereinafter
INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER]; MEAGAN BATDORFF ET AL., UNIV. OF ARK. DEP’T OF
EDUC. REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING: INEQUITY EXPANDS (2014) [hereinafter
INEQUITY EXPANDS]; MEAGAN BATDORFF ET AL., BALL STATE UNIV., CHARTER
SCHOOL FUNDING: INEQUITY PERSISTS (2010) [hereinafter INEQUITY PERSISTS].
6. See ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICA’S CHARTER SCHOOLS, supra note 1, at 9.
7. See INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at VII.
8. See INEQUITY EXPANDS, supra note 5, at 8.
9. See, e.g., Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs v. City Neighbors Charter Sch., 929
A.2d 113 (Md. 2007); Sugar Creek Charter Sch., Inc. v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of
Educ., 655 S.E.2d 850 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Foreman v. Chester-Upland Sch. Dist.,
941 A.2d 108 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008), cert. granted, 951 A.2d 264 (Pa. 2008).
10. See Saiger, supra note 3, at 914; see, e.g., Robert J. Martin, Charting the Court
Challenges to Charter Schools, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 43, 45 (2004) (examining
challenges to charter schools on state and federal constitutional grounds); Andrew
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There are myriad sources of the charter school funding gap.
Charter schools tend to have greater non-educational expenses
related to transportation, facilities, and other administrative costs.12
Using ambiguously worded state statutes, school districts have
increasingly withheld funds to charter schools allowing for
“administrative fees” or used their bargaining power to reduce funds
and services to charter schools. 13 Unlike public schools, charter
schools are often unable to access “top up” funds provided by local
tax revenue and are barred from accessing public debt markets. 14
Additionally, in most states, charter schools cannot organize as their
own Local Education Agency (LEA) and must therefore rely on the
local school board, which could be hostile to the charter school, to
appropriate funds. 15 Despite these challenges, charter schools
flourished with the support of philanthropic foundations, corporate
funding, and community support. However, donations, grants, and
corporate funding are an unreliable source of revenue, and several
charter school managers cite this reliance as a source of concern for
charter school future operation and growth. 16 Lack of adequate
funding and fiscal mismanagement are the primary reasons charter
schools close — not failure to improve student achievement. 17

Broy, Comment, Charter Schools and Education Reform: How State Constitutional
Challenges Will Alter Charter School Legislation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 493, 534 (2001).
11. See Greg Rubio, Note, Surviving Rodriguez: The Viability of Federal Equal
Protection Claims by Underfunded Charter Schools, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1643
(2008); Mark D. Evans, Comment, An End to Federal Funding of For-Profit Charter
Schools?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 617 (2008). See also Learning Cmty. Charter Sch. v.
Bd. of Educ. of Jersey City, No. A-5551-14T3, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2276
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017) (state education clause challenge); J.D. ex rel.
Scipio-Derrick v. Davy, 2 A.3d. 387 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (equal
protection challenge).
12. See CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, SOLVING THE CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING GAP
(Shaka L.A. Mitchell & Jeanne Allen eds., 2005), https://www.edreform.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/CER-CSFundingGap2005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8SL9YKE] [hereinafter CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING GAP].
13. Id.
14. INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at vii, 3.
15. See CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, WHY CHARTER SCHOOLS SHOULD BE THEIR
OWN
INDEPENDENT
LEA
(2008),
https://www.edreform.com/wp[https://perma.cc/UR3Q-884J]
content/uploads/2013/03/CER_LEA_primer.pdf
[hereinafter CHARTER SCHOOL LEA].
16. See INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at 2; INEQUITY EXPANDS, supra
note 5, at 32.
17. ALISON CONSOLETTI, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, THE STATE OF CHARTER
SCHOOLS
8–12
(2011),
https://www.edreform.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/StateOfCharterSchools_CER_Dec2011-Web-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P82T-B27E].
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This Article examines the current public sources of charter school
finance, explores the systemic reasons for the charter school funding
gap, and proposes initiatives for narrowing this gap. 18 Part I gives a
brief overview of the charter school movement and describes the
charter school funding gap and its sources. Part II examines the
process of charter school formation and maintains that authorizers
and charter school models are determinative effects of funding
disparities. Part III discusses the limited federal, state, and local
education finance programs that charter schools are eligible for, and
Part IV explores initiatives to narrow the charter school public
funding gap.
I.

CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT AND THE FUNDING
GAP

Charter schools are a fairly recent phenomenon, gaining popularity
in the early nineties and steadily gaining momentum in the public
domain through the early 2000s and, in the present, surviving
existential threats in the form of legal challenges and hostility from
local, state, and federal officials. Ever present throughout the history
of the charter school movement are conversations surrounding
educational funding for public schooling generally, and, within such
conversations, a debate as to whether charter schools ought to be
funded at the same level as traditional public schools.
A. The History and Legal Challenges to the Charter School
Movement
Charter schools are independent, non-sectarian, tuition-free public
schools that operate pursuant to a limited-duration charter, or
contract, granted by a statutorily designated sponsoring organization
(an “authorizer”). 19 Charter schools are a form of school choice
program designed to give parents and students the ability to attend
publicly funded alternative schools rather than traditional public
schools. 20 A charter is a “performance contract” whereby a school
receives “regulatory freedom in exchange for increased

18. This Article will not examine judicial responses to the charter school funding
gap. For a discussion of federal litigation of the charter school funding gap, see note
10. For a discussion of state litigation over charter schools, see note 9.
19. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 3, at 2074; Stephen D. Sugarman & Emlei M.
Kuboyama, Approving Charter Schools: The Gate-Keeper Function, 53 ADMIN. L.
REV. 869, 870 (2001).
20. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 3, at 2074.
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accountability.” 21 The charter outlines the goals of the school, how
student performance will be measured, what levels of achievement
the school will attain, and the length of the charter (typically five
years). 22 If a school succeeds in meeting its stated goals, it may be
relieved from regulations concerning student recruitment, curriculum,
budget, and staffing. 23 If at the end of the charter period the school
fails to attract students and to abide by its governing rules,
regulations, and procedures, violates other provisions of its charter, or
generally fails to raise achievement among its students, it can be
closed. 24
The charter school concept appeals to the education reform
community because it emphasizes choice, accountability, equity, and
systematic change. 25 The relatively limited regulation that charter
schools are subject to allows the schools to offer a wider array of
educational programs for students, which can serve as new and
innovative educational models, especially for at-risk youth. 26 Unlike
traditional public or private schools, charter schools typically admit
students on a lottery system whereby students who apply are
admitted at random rather than through the results of a test,
expanding student access to the schools. 27 The ability of an
authorizer to close a school provides a strict mechanism for
controlling the quality of the school — deficient schools that
consistently fail to meet educational standards are removed from the
educational marketplace. This quality control mechanism also
provides a unique market exit strategy within the educational
marketplace for schools by providing turnover for charter school
managers and a means by which educational investors may “cash out”
their investment.

21. Judith Johnson & Alex Medler, The Conceptual and Practical Development
of Charter Schools, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 291 (2000).
22. Id.; Kevin S. Huffman, Charter Schools, Equal Protection Litigation, and the
New School Reform Movement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1290, 1291 (1998).
23. Johnson & Medler, supra note 21; see also Huffman, supra note 22.
24. Johnson & Medler, supra note 21.
25. See id. at 292.
26. Id.
27. See James Forman, Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education?
Emerging Evidence from Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market for Schooling, 2007 U. ILL.

L. REV. 839, 844–67 (2007) (reviewing charter school admissions policies and studies
examining their effect).
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The charter school movement developed in the early 1980s, in part
as a response to a federal government study – A Nation at Risk 28 –
that condemned the state of American public education. The charter
school idea was also the product of several intersecting education
reform principles that emphasized devolution of school control from
central school districts to local schools and their communities,
accountability based on measurable outcomes and universal academic
standards, and the creation of an education marketplace that would
empower parents through choice and improve schools through
competition. 29 In 1988, former president of the American Federation
of Teachers, Albert Shanker, first used the phrase “charter school” to
describe publicly funded alternative independent schools. 30 Shanker
contemplated an arrangement that would “enable any school or any
group of teachers . . . within a school to develop a proposal for how
they could better educate youngsters and then give them a ‘charter’ to
implement the proposal.” 31
The charter school movement is based on four core assumptions
that emphasize choice, accountability, equity, and systemic change.
First, that charter schools allow communities to create new public
schools outside traditional structures. Second, charter schools
strengthen accountability by giving sponsoring organizations the
power to withdraw the charter based on measurable performance
goals. Third, that charter schools maintain principles of equity and
excellence in public education by providing tuition-free, non-sectarian
education available to all students, including those with special needs.
Finally, that charter schools drive broader change by serving as
“educational laboratories” for innovative forms of teaching and by
stimulating traditional schools to make positive changes. 32 These
core assumptions are reflected in state enabling statutes whose

28. See NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), https://www.edreform.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/A_Nation_At_Risk_1983.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VX4V47HL].
29. See CHESTER E. FINN ET AL., CHARTER SCHOOLS IN ACTION 53–74 (2d ed.
2001); see generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND
AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990) (arguing that government delivered education system is
inefficient); ANDREW J. COULSON, MARKET EDUCATION: THE UNKNOWN HISTORY
(1999).
30. Richard D. Kahlenberg & Halley Potter, Restoring Shanker’s Vision for
AM.
EDUCATOR,
Winter
2014–2015,
at
4,
Charter
Schools,
https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/kahlenberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SRX-G84F].
31. Albert Shanker, Restructuring Our Schools, 65 PEABODY J. EDUC. 88, 97–98
(1988).
32. See Johnson & Medler, supra note 21, at 292.
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wording determines the vitality of the charter school movement in a
particular state. 33
The success of the charter school movement can be measured in
several ways. First, state courts repeatedly approve of charter schools
by rejecting challenges brought by teachers unions and local school
boards, which often have claimed that charter schools are not public
schools, so their funding violated public funds provisions of state
constitutions. 34 Second, an increasing number of state and national
studies are concluding that charter schools raise achievement,
especially for socially and economically disadvantaged students. 35

33. For example, some states, such as Mississippi, place a cap on the number of
charter schools that can open. Mississippi only allows fifteen charter schools to be
formed in the state per year. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-7. Arizona, by contrast,
allows an unlimited number of charter schools and multiple authorizing agencies. See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-181. Mississippi currently has one charter school in the state,
while Arizona has 479. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS ACROSS
THE STATES: RANKINGS AND SCORECARDS 3 (16th ed. 2015) [hereinafter CHARTER
SCHOOL LAWS] (listing factors that make a charter school law strong). School caps
have been heavily debated in the literature surrounding charter schools. See Andrew
J. Rotherham, Smart Charter School Caps: A Third Way on Charter School Growth,
in HOPES, FEARS, AND REALITY: A BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER
SCHOOLS
IN
2007
65,
65–66
(Robin
Lake
ed.,
2007),
https://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/pub_hfr07_web_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BDD8-BYZU]; LISA M. STULBERG, BEYOND THE BATTLE LINES:
LESSONS
FROM
NEW
YORK’S
CHARTER
CAPS
FIGHT
(2007),
https://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/pub_ncsrp_battlelines_jun07_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KY8D-NA4D ]; Todd Ziebarth, Peeling the Lid off State-Imposed
Charter School Caps, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH. (Feb. 2007),
https://www.publiccharters.org/sites/default/files/migrated/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/file_Issue_Brief_3_09_07rgb_20110402T222331.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UFZ2-WNHM].
34. See State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 857
N.E.2d 1148 (Ohio 2006); Bd. of Educ. No. 1 in the City and City of Denver v. Booth,
984 P.2d 639 (Colo. 1999); Council of Orgs. & Others for Educ. about Parochiaid,
Inc. v. Engler, 566 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1997); Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Utah Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Utah State Bd. of Educ.,
17 P.3d 1125 (Utah 2001); In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application of Englewood on
the Palisades Charter Sch., 753 A.2d 687 (N.J. 2000).
35. See, e.g., Zachary Jason, The Battle over Charter Schools, HARV. ED. MAG.
(Winter
2017),
https://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/ed/17/05/battle-over-charterschools [https://perma.cc/6CD2-6YEJ] (noting that, “[n]ationwide, low-income
students, especially black and Hispanic, tend to benefit from charters the most”);
CAROLINE HOXBY, ACHIEVEMENT IN CHARTER SCHOOLS AND REGULAR PUBLIC
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES: UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES 1 (2004),
https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/4848.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6B3K-BK2D]; KEVIN BOOKER ET AL., ACHIEVEMENT AND
ATTAINMENT
IN
CHICAGO
CHARTER
SCHOOLS
(2008),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR585-1.html [https://perma.cc/5Z2X9WRL]; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., K-8 CHARTER SCHOOLS: CLOSING THE ACHIEVEMENT
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Third, surveys of public opinion toward charter schools show that a
majority of people favor charter schools in their communities,
including surveys conducted in the ten states where charter school
statutes have not been adopted. 36 Additional studies also show an
increased demand for charter schools among parents. 37 Finally,
recent studies suggest that public school districts that coexist with
charter schools for extended periods of time are positively influenced
by the charter schools. 38 This indicates an increasing acceptance of
charter schools as the primary driver of education reform in the
United States.
Despite these successes, the charter school movement has been
criticized on several grounds. Some commentators argue that
increasing reliance on charter schools will encourage creeping
privatization of public education. 39 Others argue that charter schools
GAP
(2007),
http://www.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/charterk-8/report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RSH6-KH24].
36. See CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, AMERICA’S ATTITUDES TOWARD CHARTER
SCHOOLS
5
(2008),
https://www.edreform.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/09/CST_poll20081.pdf [https://perma.cc/CET3-S36F] (noting
that more than 78% of adults support creating charter schools); William G. Howell et
al., The 2008 Education Next-PEPG Survey of Public Opinion, 8 EDUC. NEXT 1, 3, 26
(2008),
https://www.educationnext.org/the-2008-education-nextpepg-survey-ofpublic-opinion/ [https://perma.cc/6Y85-F3DF].
37. BROOKE D. TERRY & MICHAEL ALEXANDER, TEX. PUB. POL’Y FOUND.,
POLICY PERSPECTIVE: CALCULATING THE DEMAND FOR CHARTER SCHOOLS (2008),
https://files.texaspolicy.com/uploads/2018/08/16092756/2008-08-PP14-charter-bt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K5U9-JHPA]; Gary Larson, Familiarity Breeds Content: As the
Charter Movement Grows, So Does Public Approval, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB.
CHARTER
SCH.
(Feb.
2008),
https://www.publiccharters.org/sites/default/files/migrated/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/file_NAPCS_Familiarity_Breeds_Web_Version_2_20110402
T222338.pdf [https://perma.cc/JLC2-MM9D].
38. See, e.g., Christine Campbell & Deborah Warnock, Life After Charters:
School Districts and Charter School Growth, in HOPES, FEARS, & REALITY: A
BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER SCHOOLS IN 2006 11, 17–18 (Robin J.
Lake & Paul T. Hill eds., 2006) (examining the Dayton School District and finding
public school improvement with competition from charter schools); George M.
Holmes et al., Does School Choice Increase School Quality? 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 9683, 2003) (finding that the introduction of charter
school in North Carolina affected the performance of traditional public schools even
though students leaving the school district for charter schools were generally high
performers).
39. See, e.g., Barbara Miner, Keeping Public Schools Public: Exploding the
Privatization
Myth,
21
RETHINKING
SCHOOLS
14
(2006),
http://www.rethinkingschools.org/archive/21_01/expl211.shtml
[https://perma.cc/872C-FEH8] (referring to incremental privatization of public
functions); see also Richard Mora & Mary Christianakis, Charter Schools, Market
Capitalism, and Obama’s Neo-Liberal Agenda, 4 J. INQUIRY & ACTION EDUC. 93, 102
(2011).
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are undoing the racial integration efforts of the 1970s and 1980s by
admitting local students from a population that is homogenous.40
Several states have attempted to address this issue by statutorily
requiring racial balancing within charters schools. 41 Moreover, critics
argue that because charter schools are under pressure to meet
exacting state and federal accountability standards, they often
“counsel out” students with disabilities or special needs, shifting the
burden of high-cost, hard-to-educate students to public schools. 42
Some have also maintained that charter schools are guilty of “creamskimming” — attracting motivated students with involved, supportive
parents — while leaving public schools to educate the rest. 43
Many of these criticisms are unwarranted. Several recent surveys
indicate that the student body at most charter schools mirrors that in
public schools of the host school district. 44 In fact, these studies show
that because of parents’ frustrations with the public education system,
charter schools attract even more socio-economically disadvantaged
and special needs students than surrounding public schools. 45 Indeed,
several state charter school laws direct authorizers to favor granting
charters to schools that will serve at-risk youth. 46 In addition, some
commentators have shown that charter schools prevent “creamskimming” by relying on lottery admissions policies, such that the
charter schools do not adversely affect neighboring public schools.47
Lastly, it is of note that the aforementioned criticisms call into
40. Andre Perry, How Charter Schools Are Prolonging Segregation, BROOKINGS
INST. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/12/11/howcharter-schools-are-prolonging-segregation/ [https://perma.cc/566V-A8UE].
41. The constitutionality of such laws has yet to be tested under the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701 (2007). See also Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, Charter
Schools: Racial-Balancing Provisions and Parents Involved, 61 ARK. L. REV. 1, 1
(2008); Julie F. Mead, Conscious Use of Race as a Voluntary Means to Educational

Ends in Elementary and Secondary Education: A Legal Argument Derived from
Recent Judicial Decisions, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2002).
42. See generally Clarisse C. Casanova, Note & Comment, Charter Schools: A
Step in the Right Direction or a Fourth Left Turn for Public Education?, 7 WHITTIER

J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 231, 232 (2008) (arguing that charter school laws need to be
reformed to account for special needs students).
43. See Forman, supra note 27, at 855–65 (reviewing charter school admissions
studies).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. F. HOWARD NELSON ET AL., VENTURESOME CAPITAL: STATE CHARTER
SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEMS 42 (2000) [hereinafter VENTURESOME CAPITAL]
(providing examples of states, such as Colorado, Illinois, and Texas, that favor
formation of charter schools for at-risk youth).
47. See Forman, supra note 27, at 865.
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question whether charter schools are fair when compared with the
progress of public schools — they do not impugn the success that
charter schools themselves have had in raising student achievement.
In many ways, however, charter schools may also be victims of
their own success. Charter schools educate roughly two percent of
student public enrollment, but over twenty-five percent of charter
school students reside in California, Arizona, Texas, and Washington,
D.C. 48 Moreover, the Center for Education Reform, a charter school
advocacy body, notes that many states place severe limitations on
charter school funding and grant host school districts the power to
withhold funds from charter schools. 49 On the federal level, charter
schools are still subjected to the Every Student Succeeds Act, 50 which
replaced No Child Left Behind, as well as other federal statutes and
regulations. Like their public-school counterparts, charter schools
must show improved educational outcomes through standardized
testing. Additionally, charter schools tend to be located in large cities
and attract a disproportionate number of poor, low-achieving, and
African American students. All these practical hurdles stand in
contrast with the movement’s wide public exposure as an education
reform model. This begs the question: What should the public at
large, and parents with school-aged children in particular, truly expect
from charter schools? To expect charter schools to outperform all
public schools would be “nothing short of a miracle.” 51
B.

Money Matters: The Public Charter School Funding Gap

In the background of the charter school movement’s success are
two interrelated problems endemic to any systemic educational
reform: recruiting talented school leaders and teachers to produce
quality charter schools, and receiving equal funding to traditional
public schools for operational and facility expenses. 52 In the grand
scheme of educational reform, it is true that teachers, and to some

48. James E. Ryan, Charter Schools and Public Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
393, 394 (2008) [hereinafter Charter Schools and Public Education].
49. See CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING GAP, supra note 12, at 2 (stating that South
Carolina school districts have chosen to withhold funding without challenge).
50. Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802. The
purpose of ESSA, stated at § 1001 (20 U.S.C. § 6301), is to “provide all children
significant opportunity to receive a fair, equitable, and high-quality education, and to
close educational achievement gaps.”
51. Charter Schools and Public Education, supra note 48, at 399–400.
52. Id. at 400–01.
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extent administrators, matter. 53 Yet the ability for charter schools to
recruit teachers has led to the problem of teacher quality and
academic improvement in the classroom, and this has led to the larger
discussion of performance rates of charter schools in comparison to
traditional public schools. 54 Unlike the overwhelmingly positive
conversation regarding teachers, charter school finance programs
have generated a heated debate on the importance of funding in
education and how best to allocate scarce education-related dollars. 55
Several studies have shown that charter schools receive less public
education funding than their traditional public counterparts. Like
public schools, charter schools receive funding from a mixture of
federal, state, and local sources based on factors such as enrollment,
student characteristics, and location. 56 In 2003, the American
Federation of Teachers released a study of charter school finance
entitled Paying for the Vision, which illustrates funding disparities
between charter schools and traditional public schools ranging
between $549 and $1,841 per pupil. 57 That same year, the RAND
Corporation released a report on California charter schools, finding
that “[c]harter schools have significantly lower participation than
conventional public schools in categorical aid programs outside the
block grant” and that “[t]he majority of charter schools are struggling

53. Id. at 401; see Charles Clotfelter et al., High-Poverty Schools and the
Distribution of Teachers and Principals, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1347–48 (2007)

(discussing recent data on teacher and principal effectiveness on student success).
54. See Charter Schools and Public Education, supra note 48, at 402 (stating that
charter schools may have an advantage in recruiting highly qualified teachers but
data does not exist to support that this form of recruitment is the most effective way).
55. See, e.g., Craig Harris, The Charter-vs.-District School Funding Debate: Who
Gets More Money?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (July 12, 2018, 8:24 PM),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-education/2018/07/12/arizonacharter-schools-get-more-state-funding-pay-their-teachers-less/686900002/
[https://perma.cc/A2E6-2YDY]; Nic Garcia, Charter School Funding Debate Takes
Center Stage at Senate Education Committee, CHALKBEAT (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2017/02/09/charter-school-funding-debate-takescenter-stage-at-senate-education-committee/ [https://perma.cc/BNE4-PFPZ].
56. See generally Charter Schools: Who Provides Charter Schools with Their
Funding? 50-State Comparison, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (Jan. 2018),
http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestNB2C?rep=CS1717
[https://perma.cc/4NG6BX68] [hereinafter 50-State Comparison]; Charter Schools: How Is the Funding for a
Charter School Determined?, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (Jan. 2018),
http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestNB2C?rep=CS1716
[https://perma.cc/XR284ZR7]; VENTURESOME CAPITAL, supra note 46, at 1–7.
57. Eric Osberg, Charter School Funding, in CHARTER SCHOOLS AGAINST THE
ODDS 46 (Paul T. Hill ed., 2006).
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with acquiring and financing facilities.” 58 While these studies suggest
that the gap between traditional and charter schools may be rather
small, the methodology of these reports reflects what charter schools
are expected to receive rather than calculating what charter schools
actually receive. 59
In a comprehensive study of charter school funding mentioned
previously, Inequity’s Next Frontier, the Thomas B. Fordham
Foundation found disparities in actual revenue received by charter
schools and public schools, between a $245 per pupil (2.4% disparity)
at its lowest and an estimated $3,453 per pupil (39.5% disparity) at its
highest. 60 The study examined sixteen states and the District of
Columbia, encompassing 84% of the nation’s charter school students
during the 2002–2003 school year. 61 The greatest gaps were found in
large urban school districts, where the average gap was $2,256 per
pupil (23.5%), while the range extended from $766 (9.9%) per pupil in
Albuquerque, New Mexico to $3,369 (40.4%) per pupil in San Diego,
California. 62 The effect of this funding gap on charter schools is
substantial: In a charter school with 250 students enrolled and a
funding gap of $2,256 per pupil, the charter school is shortchanged
$564,000. While this data does not directly consider services and
administrative fees that charter schools pay to local education
agencies, the substantial funding gaps in most districts suggest that
even a small change in funding would give charter schools greater
access to operational funds they otherwise lack. Reports examining
the funding disparities in Colorado, New York, Ohio, and Texas
corroborate Inequity’s Next Frontier findings, and show that funding
disparities persist. 63 Additionally, studies subsequent to Inequity’s
58. Cathy Krop, Charter School Finances and Facilities, in CHARTER SCHOOL
OPERATIONS AND PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA 113–14 (R. Zimmer
et al. eds., 2003).
59. See Osberg, supra note 57, at 47.
60. INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at 1.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2–3.
63. See ROBIN JACOBOWITZ & JONATHAN S. GYURKO, CHARTER SCHOOL
FUNDING IN NEW YORK: PERSPECTIVES ON PARITY WITH TRADITIONAL PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
2
(2004),
https://steinhardt.nyu.edu/scmsAdmin/media/users/ggg5/Charter_School_Funding_in
_New_York_-_Jacobowitz_Gyurko_Mar_2004.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MFE6-BBJB]
(noting that funding disparities exist between charter schools and traditional public
schools at all levels of education and in both general and special education); COLO.
LEAGUE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS, SHORTCHANGED CHARTERS: HOW FUNDING
DISPARITIES
HURT COLORADO’S
CHARTER
SCHOOLS
3,
9
(2008),
http://facilitiesinitiative.org/media/1231/shortchangedcharters_colorado.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5CZT-T4MZ]; How Are Charters Funded?, TEX. CHARTER SCH.
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Next Frontier, published in 2010 and 2014, show that the funding

disparity between traditional public schools and charter schools
stands between 20% and 30%. 64 In each case, public schools receive
more funding on a per-pupil basis than charter schools, creating a
considerable funding gap between charter and public schools.
The funding gap can be partly attributed to two causes: the impact
of claims made by early proponents of the charter school movement
who downplayed the importance of funding, combined with the fears
of education establishment advocates over having less money for
public schools. Since the beginning of the charter school movement,
advocates have argued that charter schools could do more with less —
the charter school model allowed non-profit and for-profit
management companies to streamline operations and cut out waste
such as burdensome collective bargaining agreements or facilities
service contracts. 65 Initially, charter schools were lauded not for
student achievement, but for their ability to operate efficiently.66
For-profit management companies like Edison Schools report of their
ability to generate profit by taking public money and successfully
running schools at lower costs. 67 Indeed, advocates for privatization
of government services often cite charter schools as evidence that the
private sector can provide services, such as public education, more
efficiently than the government could. 68 These arguments were

ASS’N,
http://www.txcharterschools.org/what-is-a-charter-school/how-are-chartersfunded/ [https://perma.cc/Q46G-SKJW]. See also Myths and Facts, OHIO ALL. FOR
PUB. CHARTER SCH., http://oapcs.org/myths-and-facts/ [https://perma.cc/5ZM78EEN].
64. INEQUITY PERSISTS, supra note 5, at i (reporting on a subsequent study to
INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, which revealed consistent findings using data from fiscal
year 2006–2007); INEQUITY EXPANDS, supra note 5, at 5 (reporting consistent findings
using data from fiscal year 2010–2011).
65. See, e.g., Corey A. DeAngelis & Ben DeGrow, Charters Do More with Less,
DETROIT
NEWS
(Feb.
7,
2018),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2018/02/07/charters-less/110209770/
[https://perma.cc/UT95-2BMA]; CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOLS:
TODAY, CHANGING THE FACE OF AMERICAN EDUCATION, STATISTICS, STORIES, AND
INSIGHTS 7 (Anna Varghese Marcucio et al. eds., 2004); Charter Schools: Finding out
CTR.
FOR
PUBLIC
EDUC.
(Mar.
2010),
the
Facts,
http://centerforpubliceducation.org/research/charter-schools-finding-out-facts-0
[https://perma.cc/74GR-A9DV].
66. See Chester E. Finn, Jr. et al., Where Did They Come from?, in CHARTER
SCHOOLS IN ACTION: REVIEWING PUBLIC EDUCATION 53, 67–68 (2000).
67. See CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, Charter Schools: Today, Changing the Face of
American Education, Statistics, Stories, and Insights 7 (Anna Varghese Marcucio et
al. eds., 2004).
68. Sandra Vergari, The Politics of Charter Schools, 21 EDUC. POL’Y 15, 17
(2007).
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bolstered by studies dating back to James Coleman’s famous report,
Equality and Equal Education, which found that student body
characteristics exert greater influence on academic achievement than
external inputs such as funding. 69 In short, the early charter school
movement was sold on the premise that funding played a minimal
role in promoting student achievement, and that innovative
educational programs, teachers, and student body composition were
primarily responsible for diminishing student risk factors. 70
Simultaneously, education establishment advocates, local school
boards, and teacher unions argued that funding for public schools
mattered and that charter schools threatened to take desperately
needed funds away from public schools. 71 Moreover, education
establishment advocates maintained that public schools must educate
every child, unlike charter schools that encourage high-cost students
not to enroll or can simply drop them under the claim that they do
not meet school specific criteria. 72 This practice, the argument goes,
drives a disproportionate burden of high-cost students to public
school districts, who must bear the added costs to provide special
services that exceed state and federal aid.
There is a third cause of the funding gap that is important to
consider — that education finance politics at the state and local level
generally disfavor charter schools. Indeed, funding disparities
between charter and public schools tend to be the greatest in states
that rely primarily on local funding for education. 73 Some states
attempt to offset this by denying access to local funds and
apportioning larger amounts of state aid to charter schools; however,
this often does not completely fill the gap and leaves charter schools

69. See JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
22, 29 (1966) (finding school environment (for example, integration) had a more
influential effect on African-American educational achievement than facilities and
curriculum. For a more modern take on this argument, see Eric Hanushek, When
School Finance “Reform” May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423
(1991)).
70. See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 69, at 22; James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and
Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 286–87, 291 (1999) [hereinafter Schools, Race, and
Money].
71. See Matthew Arkin & Bryan C. Hassel, The Bottom Line: Six Myths About
the Financial Impact of Public Charter Schools, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER
SCHS.
ISSUE
BRIEF
1
(2007),
https://www.publiccharters.org/sites/default/files/migrated/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/Financial_Impact_of_Public_Charter_Schools_Brief_201104
02T222342.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P6T-LWYT].
72. See Forman, supra note 27, at 840, 852.
73. Osberg, supra note 57, at 55–56.
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vulnerable to state-level funding cuts. 74 The combined effect of the
three reasons for the funding gap — charter school advocates arguing
they can use funds more effectively and efficiently, public school
establishment advocates urging that charter schools divert needed
funds away from public schools, and anti-charter state and local
education finance politics — result in state statutes that legally
cement unequal funding schemes. 75 Thus, charter schools often fail
simply because they are unable to finance basic educational
programs. 76
This has proven to be tremendously problematic. Despite early
claims that funding does not matter, there is now data that suggests
funding can affect student achievement, particularly for charter
schools serving at-risk youth. 77 Charter schools, by and large, educate
the same student population as public schools, 78 and in some districts
they serve a disproportionate number of at-risk and special needs
students. Allocating less funding to charter schools places them on
unequal footing with traditional public schools, and subject charter
schools to greater risk of failure should their alternative sources of
funding run dry. 79 Moreover, studies have shown that, rather than
decrease the amount of funds available to school districts, charter
schools effectively increase public funds and increase overall
community investment in public education through additional public
and private donations. 80 Thus, there is an increasing consensus that

74. INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at 14; see also INEQUITY EXPANDS,
supra note 5, at 23 (stating that charter schools face greater impact than district

schools when state and local funds are cut).
75. See Vergari, supra note 68, at 22–24, 26.
76. See Arkin & Hassel, supra note 71, at 7.
77. See Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 70, at 285, 292, 296 (stating that
disadvantaged youth cost more to educate, as they require additional educational
programs and non-academic services. However, expenditures alone will not increase
student performance. The greatest influence on achievement is student body
composition.).
78. See Bruno V. Manno, The Case Against Charter Schools: A Proponent
Responds to the 10 Most Common Complaints About the Charter Movement, AM.
ASS’N
OF
SCH.
ADM’RS,
http://www.aasa.org/SchoolAdministratorArticle.aspx?id=10850
[https://perma.cc/LJ34-ZJGY].
79. Charter Schools and Public Education, supra note 48, at 400–01 (noting that it
is ironic that conservative think tanks, such as the Thomas B. Fordham Foundation,
are now arguing that funding matters, given their traditional argument in school
finance litigation that money is unrelated to student achievement).
80. See, e.g., Arkin & Hassel, supra note 71, at 1–2 (stating that successful charter
schools have the positive effects of improving local communities and increasingly
cover education expenditures through private donations).
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in order for charter schools to effectively compete and pursue
innovative educational, management, and financial programs, they
must be placed on equal footing with public schools and receive equal
funding.
II. NEGOTIATING FOR A CHARTER: AUTHORIZERS AND
SCHOOL FORMS
To better understand the charter school funding gap, an analysis of
the sources of revenue is needed. Parts II and III examine the charter
approval process and charter school revenue sources. Part II
describes the negotiation process and the inherently disadvantageous
bargaining position charter schools find themselves in when applying
for a charter, and how that affects their funding. Part III describes
the most resource intensive activities of charter schools — operations,
start-up funding, facilities, special education, at-risk youth programs,
and transportation — and discusses different state approaches to
charter school funding. These Parts provide a foundation for the
state and local initiatives proposed in Part IV.
A. Charters and Authorizers
Authorizers perform an essential “gate-keeping” function for the
state. They decide which schools receive charters, enforce the terms
of those charters, and evaluate whether the school can retain the
charter after its expiration. 81 Authorizers also act as the bridge
between the regulatory authority of the state and unregulated forms
of education, such as private religious schools. 82 State statutes
designate various kinds of authorizers, including local education
agencies, the state education agency, specially created state charter
school agencies, post-secondary institutions, and, in a small number of
states, local elected officials. 83 The majority of states only give
chartering authority to the local school district, 84 but states with
81. Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 19, at 870.
82. See id. at 878. For an example of a state in which a local school board’s
approval is required, see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-305(a) (2018). For an example of a
state in which the state education agency acts as a statewide authorizer, see N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:3 (2018), and for an example of a specially created state
charter school agency, see MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-28-5(c), -7(1) (2018). Michigan is
one state in which post-secondary institutions, such as public universities, act as
authorizers. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.501(2)(a)(iv) (2018). A mayor of a city in
which a school district is located may also be an authorizer in Ohio. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3311.86(B) (LexisNexis 2018).
83. Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 19, at 880–82.
84. See id. at 884.
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multiple authorizers tend to have the most robust charter school
programs in terms of efficiency and quality. 85
Generally, charter applicants must submit proposals to an
authorizer. 86 Authorizers often publish guidelines with information
regarding criteria for selecting initial applications, and several districts
have offered workshops to help would-be applicants. 87 Once an
applicant has passed an initial screening, the authorizer usually
requests a more detailed proposal, which is then subjected to an
intense qualitative screening in which the authorizer retains full
discretion to reject the application. 88 The criteria for charter approval
varies widely from state to state, in large part due to the vagueness of
authorizing statutes. 89 If a charter is denied or not renewed, some
states provide for an administrative appeals process that may, in turn,
be appealed in state court. 90
Authorizers play a key role in the success of a charter school.
Through their application, renewal, and closure decisions, authorizers
ensure that charter schools remain autonomous, while holding them
accountable to federal and state education progress goals as well as
the terms of the charter. Authorizers know their schools well,
provide support for struggling programs, and effectively act as a
“portfolio manager” to attract a diverse set of charter school
applicants. 91 State education agencies could serve in this capacity as

85. See CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33, at 3–4, 6.
86. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-183(A) (2018).
87. See, e.g., N.H. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHARTER SCHOOL APPLICATION GUIDELINES
(Mar.
2012),
https://www.education.nh.gov/instruction/school_improve/charter/documents/csoapp_
guidelines_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK8S-63CQ]; Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra
note 19, at 891.
88. Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 19, at 889–90 (describing Massachusetts’s
application process).
89. See id. at 893–94 (discussing the conflict between state and local governments
in deciding charter school approval criteria and the different values that such conflicts
are fought over).
90. See, e.g., James Acad. of Excellence v. Dorchester Cty. Sch. Dist. Two, 657
S.E.2d 469, 471 (S.C. 2008); Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cty. v. Acads. of Excellence, Inc., 974
So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming reversal of denial of charter
school application by Department of Education); Cmty. Serv. Leadership Dev.
Charter Sch. v. Pittsburgh Sch. Dist., 34 A.3d 919, 920 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012)
(requiring state charter school appeal board to articulate deficiencies in charter
school application); see also In re Proposed Quest Acad., Charter Sch. of Montclair
Founders Grp., 2014 WL 7671578, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 26, 2015)
(reviewing the fifth denial of a charter school application).
91. Katherine Destler, Charter Authorizing: It’s a Dirty Job, but Somebody’s Got
to Do It, in HOPES, FEARS, & REALITY: A BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER
SCHOOLS IN 2006 49, 55, 57 (Robin J. Lake & Paul T. Hill eds., 2006).
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well, but studies show that creating a competitive market for
authorizing entities generates better schools with closer oversight,
promoting investment from the authorizer, the charter school itself,
and the community that the school serves. 92
By contrast, local school boards generally do not make good
authorizers because of the influence of local politics, inadequate
infrastructure development, and their tendency to stress complianceFurther, public school districts cannot
based accountability. 93
successfully act as authorizers because they have an inherent conflict
of interest with charter schools — public schools directly compete
with charter schools for enrollment and funding. There is a growing
trend to open up the field of authorizers to alternative entities, such
as independent charter school boards, universities or colleges, state
boards, local mayors, city councils, non-profit organizations, and
regional educational entities. 94 Such entities not only avoid the
inherent conflict of interest between public school districts and
charter schools, they can also stimulate beneficial competition in the
authorizer field, thereby encouraging experimentation in charter
authorizing and providing incentives for traditional public school
districts to improve. 95 A mixture of diverse authorizers may thus not
only improve the function of charter schools themselves, but also
accelerate systemic reforms in public school governance. 96

92. BRYAN HASSEL ET AL., ECS ISSUE BRIEF: A STATE POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE TO
ALTERNATIVE
AUTHORIZERS
OF
CHARTER
SCHOOLS
(Sept.
2005),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED489327.pdf [https://perma.cc/FDD9-TNRG]; see
also Marc J. Holley et al., Competition with Charters Motivates Districts, EDUC.
NEXT (2013), https://www.educationnext.org/competition-with-charters-motivatesdistricts/ [https://perma.cc/4JG6-ABAG].
93. LOUANN BIERLEIN PALMER & REBECCA GAU, CHARTER SCHOOL
AUTHORIZING: ARE STATES MAKING THE GRADE? 1 (2003); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, D.C. CHARTER SCHOOLS: STRENGTHENING MONITORING
AND PROCESS WHEN SCHOOLS CLOSE COULD IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND EASE
STUDENT TRANSITIONS 3–4 (2005) (finding that the D.C. Public Charter School
Board was more effective than the D.C. Public School Board at monitoring charter
schools in the District of Columbia).
94. HASSEL ET AL., supra note 92, at 1–8 (evaluating different charter school
authorizers); see also supra note 70.
95. HASSEL ET AL., supra note 92, at 1–8 (evaluating different charter school
authorizers); see also supra note 70.
96. There is growing literature on what form of regulation ought to be used for
authorizers — government or market based. See supra note 77.
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Charter School Forms

As discussed above, the authorizer overseeing the chartering
process has a great effect on the success of a charter school. The
application process for charter authorization is arduous, and most
successful charter schools allow for at least a two-year buffer between
announcing their intent to apply for a charter and the official opening
of the school. 97 Part of what makes the chartering process so difficult
is political, as charter school founders must garner support from
community members, local politicians, and state education officials to
successfully obtain authorization.
But another significant hurdle to opening a charter school is lack of
start-up funds, leading to reliance on private sources of revenue. 98
Some authorizers provide a bridge loan or aid applicants in obtaining
state and federal grants to cover start-up costs. 99 However, more
often than not, the authorizer lacks the ability to aid the charter
school financially, leaving applicants to seek out philanthropic or
private corporate sponsorship. 100 This scarcity of funds inevitably
influences the choice of form of the charter school. Charter school
forms can be plotted on a continuum, from non-profit to for-profit.
States tend to favor non-profit charter schools because of a perceived
lack of a financial conflict of interest between the educational needs
of the students versus the profit-driven motives of a corporation. 101
Charter school operators, however, have created innovative ways to
combine for-profit and non-profit forms. 102

97. The most successful charter school programs, Knowledge is Power Program
Network (KIPP) and Achievement First, invest one year in training school leaders in
school management and designing successful charter schools, and the second year in
building the school’s organizational infrastructure, hiring teachers, finding a building,
and working within a targeted community. See generally KNOWLEDGE IS POWER
PROGRAM, http://www.kipp.org [https://perma.cc/P686-2HN9]; ACHIEVEMENT FIRST,
http://www.achievementfirst.org/ [https://perma.cc/56QR-ZTLJ].
98. VANDERBILT PEABODY COLL., STARTING STRONG: BEST PRACTICES IN
STARTING A CHARTER SCHOOL 20 (2013).
99. NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS & LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT
CORP., CHARTER LENDERS & CHARTER AUTHORIZERS: CAN WE TALK? 7 (2015).
100. See generally id.
101. See John Morley, Note, For-Profit and Non-Profit Charter Schools: An
Agency Costs Approach, 115 YALE L.J. 1782, 1789 (2006) (discussing the dominance
of non-profit charter holding entities); see also Charter Schools FAQ, TENN. DEP’T
EDUC. (2018), https://www.tn.gov/education/school-options/charter-schools/charterschool-faq.html [https://perma.cc/5X37-XYVL] (noting that charter school entities
must be non-profit entities that include parents in their governing bodies).
102. See Morley, supra note 101; Charter School FAQ, supra note 101.
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Purely non-profit charter schools are organized under state laws as
non-profit corporations that qualify for tax exemptions under Internal
Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3). 103 The non-profit entity that holds
the school’s charter manages the overall strategy, day-to-day
operations, and directly employs the teachers, administrators, and
staff. 104 This form of charter school includes schools that are legally a
part of the school district in which they operate, as well as schools
operated by non-profit management entities hired by the non-profit
corporation. 105 This structure minimizes profit as a motive for the
school, by having either a government entity or a non-profit manage
the charter school. On the opposite end of the continuum are forprofit business entities that hold the charter and manage the school’s
operations. 106 Such for-profit schools are very rare and are often
prohibited by state law. 107
In the middle are “hybrid” schools: a non-profit entity receives and
holds the school’s charter and then contracts with a for-profit firm to
manage the school’s operations. 108 Hybrid schools attempt to
circumvent state laws that deny for-profit entities from holding a
school’s charter by having a non-profit entity hold the charter instead.
In addition, the hybrid model avoids the Department of Education’s
policy that federal funds only go to non-profit charter schools.109
Nationally, approximately fourteen to nineteen percent of non-profit

103. See Morley, supra note 101; Charter School FAQ, supra note 101.
Organizations that receive a 501(c)(3) designation by the IRS are treated as exempt
from federal taxation, and donations to such organizations are tax deductible for the
donor.
104. See Morley, supra note 101.
105. See, e.g., Sandra Vergari, The Regulatory Styles of Statewide Charter School
Authorizers: Arizona, Massachusetts, and Michigan, 36 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 730, 736
tbl.2 (2000); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS
PROGRAM 32–33 (2004) [hereinafter PCSP EVALUATION].
106. Only six states allow a for-profit entity to hold the school’s charter and
operate the school: Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Virginia, and
Wisconsin. See generally CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33.
107. With the exception of the six states listed in note 42, all other states bar a forprofit entity from holding a school’s charter. However, only four states currently
outright bar for-profit management of a non-profit charter school: Hawaii, Iowa,
Mississippi, and Tennessee. See generally CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33.
108. Morley, supra note 101, at 1790.
109. See Evans, supra note 11 (discussing 9th Circuit’s upholding Department of
Education’s policy).
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charter schools contract with for-profit management firms for at least
some services. 110
Hybrid schools can lean toward the non-profit or for-profit ends of
the charter school form continuum.
This depends on two
considerations — the extent of the services provided by the for-profit
management firm, and the fee arrangement between the for-profit
firm and the non-profit entity that holds the charter. In terms of the
kinds of services provided by for-profit firms, some hybrids only
contract for limited logistical services or curriculum outlines, and thus
fall closer to the non-profit end. The Department of Education has
found, however, that 71% of hybrid schools hired for-profit firms to
“manag[e] the overall operation or administration of [the] school.” 111
This means that, at least when considering the services provided by
for-profit firms, most hybrid schools lean towards the for-profit end of
the spectrum.
A hybrid school’s fee arrangement may vary depending on whether
the school’s operating costs are included in the management firm’s
fee. 112 A for-profit management company may receive a fixed fee
calculated per student, per school, or according to some other
method. 113 The difference between the arrangements centers on
when operating costs are paid by the management company and what
effect such costs have on the fee. Under an arrangement whereby
operating costs are paid by the charter holding entity in addition to
the fixed fee, a management company would have little incentive to
cut costs or quality, except that overspending may render the nonprofit insolvent. 114 This is because the management company would
need to pay the school’s operating costs using a portion of their
management fees — they receive a fixed fee before such costs are
paid, regardless of how high or low the operating costs are. Including
operating costs within the management firms fixed fee, however, gives
a for-profit company the greatest incentive to cut costs, since it
receives the remaining surplus, making the “cost-included” fee

110. Id.; Morley, supra note 101, at 1790 (citing studies by Arizona State University
in the early 2000s that examined the market share of for-profit charter schools and
that, notably, did not consider hybrid schools to be “for-profit”).
111. PCSP EVALUATION, supra note 105, at 34 exhibit 3–14. Sixty-four percent
have the for-profit firms direct curriculum and instruction, and sixty percent had the
firms hire staff. Id. Sixty-four percent of non-profit charter-holding entities in hybrid
schools also receive seed or start-up money from their for-profit managers. Id.
112. Little is known about fee arrangements since most for-profit entities are not
subject to public reporting requirements. See Morley, supra note 101, at 1792.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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arrangement the preferred arrangement for for-profit management
This is because the operating costs that the
companies. 115
management company would need to pay are already built into the
fee that they receive, so the management company receives the
benefit of reducing operating costs as much as it can.
Non-profit charter holders used to dominate the charter school
market. 116 However, a for-profit entity’s ability to “raise capital and
[to] exploit economies of scale” provides them with significant
advantages compared to purely non-profit models. 117 Whereas purely
non-profit firms must rely on federal and state grant programs and on
philanthropic grants, loans, or private donations for start-up money,
for-profit firms may receive more readily available start-up funds
from a corporate parent. As a result, hybrid schools are beginning to
become popular in the charter school market. 118
This raises a fundamental question: To what extent should public
charter schools be operated or influenced by non-community
members? Early charter school advocates hailed charter schools as a
return to community-based schooling, with control maintained by a
cadre of committed education professionals directly accountable to
parents. 119 It is now more likely, however, that a charter school has a
relationship with a for-profit manager or outside philanthropist, who
has specific ideas about the structure and function of the school. 120
While this private funding has certainly increased overall investment
in public education over the past three decades, policymakers must
ask themselves whether this form of investment compromises the
goals of public education. This is because, to a large extent, private

115. Id.
116. Id. at 1794–95. Morley points to several explanations, including contract
failure theory for non-profit organizations, high monitoring costs for charter schools
by parents, donors, and governments, and the non-distribution constraint on nonprofits to self-regulate. Id. at 1795–1810.
117. Id. at 1811.
118. See generally Alan Singer, Big Profits in Not-for-Profit Charter Schools,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/alansinger/charter-school-executive-profit_b_5093883.html
[https://perma.cc/U4CVJB28].
119. See generally supra note 28.
120. Several philanthropists have given large amounts of money to finance charter
school formation, such as the Walton family (Walmart), the Fisher family (the Gap),
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. See, e.g., Bryan C. Hassel & Thomas
Toch, Big Box: How the Heirs of the Wal-Mart Fortune Have Fueled the Charter
School Movement, AM. INST. FOR RES. (Nov. 7, 2006), https://www.air.org/edsectorarchives/publications/big-box-how-heirs-wal-mart-fortune-have-fueled-charter-school
[https://perma.cc/Q56C-AGT8].
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funding of charter schools has directly filled the void made by
policymakers when they inequitably fund charter schools through
public resources. Understanding the specific sources of public
funding for charter schools, and how they create a gap, illustrates that
state policymakers increasingly allow and encourage private
investment in public schools.
III. CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING SOURCES
Like district public schools, charter schools receive a mixture of
federal, state, and local funds. For school districts with over fifteenthousand students, the federal, state, and local governments provided
for, on average, 8.4%, 46.5%, and 45% (respectively) of the district’s
funds for the 2014–2015 school year. 121 Schools receive money from
the federal government through the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA), 122 which was substantially modified by the
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), 123 the Individual with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), 124 and the Every Student Succeeds Act
(ESSA). 125 Typically, a state education system consists of a state
education agency (SEA) that determines education standards, and
controls access to federal and state funds. The SEA often creates,
evaluates, and distributes funds to local education agencies (LEA),
also referred to simply as local school districts. In several states,
charter schools can organize as their own LEAs. When doing so,
charter schools agree to be held directly accountable to certain
federal and state regulations that attach to specific funding sources.

121. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2014–15 (FISCAL YEAR
2015) 4 tbl.1, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018301.pdf [https://perma.cc/JM72BEMK]. The Department of Education estimated for FY 2009 that it needed to
disburse $14.3 billion in Title I funds and $12.1 billion in IDEA funds. U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., FUNDS FOR STATE FORMULA-ALLOCATED AND SELECTED STUDENT AID
PROGRAMS
(2010),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/statetables/11stbystate.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KJ7V-DQ4U]. Charter schools must be treated as other public
schools for the purpose of distributing ESEA and IDEA funds. U.S. DEP’T EDUC.,
Nonregulatory Guidance, 34 CFR Part 76, Subpart H (Dec. 2000),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/cschools/cguidedec2000.doc
[https://perma.cc/7S7V-UW4X].
122. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27.
123. See generally No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115
Stat. 1425 (2002).
124. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
125. See generally Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-95, 129 Stat.
1802. It is important to note that ESSA substantially modified and replaced
significant portions of NCLB.
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The majority of states funnel charter school funding through school
district LEAs, which are statutorily allowed to withhold and negotiate
administrative or in-kind service fees, and to charge market rates for
renting school district property.
This Part examines the distinctions between funding sources
available to charter schools against those available to traditional
public schools even when the two address the same expenditures.
These expenditures include operation, start-up funding, facilities,
programs for at-risk youth and special education, and transportation.
Compared to traditional public schools, charter schools are at a
disadvantage in covering all these expenditures because traditional
public schools simply have access to better funding sources or can
limit their expenditures in ways that charter schools cannot.
A. Operations
General operational funding refers to fungible sources of money
that public schools can use to pay for instruction, student services,
administration, facilities maintenance, food services, and other
support services at the school. 126 School funding formulas for general
operations are notoriously complex. Generally speaking, they
depend on a whether the state primarily relies on local tax revenues
or state education expenditures to fund public schools. 127 The
majority of states employ a traditional model of school finance: local
tax revenues account for the majority of school funding, and the state
provides aid to equalize disparities between districts. 128 Some states,
such as Michigan, use alternate sources of revenue for school funding
(such as sales taxes or gambling taxes), which are distributed by the
SEA to the various school districts according to complex funding
formulas that weigh student characteristics, geography, and other
factors. 129

126. For the most recent statistics on how each these sub-functions of a school
breakdown, see NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR
PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2013–14 (FISCAL
YEAR
2014)
10–11
tbl.4,
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016301.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RG65-W7A6].
127. See generally 50-State Comparison, supra note 56.
128. See generally MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A
FEDERAL SYSTEM 749–56 (8th ed. 2014) (describing the primary approaches to state
appropriation of aid to school districts based on the amount of money they can raise
locally).
129. See C. PHILIP KEARNEY & MICHAEL F. ADDONIZIO, A PRIMER ON MICHIGAN
SCHOOL FINANCE (4th ed. 2002) (describing changes in Michigan school funding
formulas).
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To fund charter schools, nearly all states provide state and local
funding based on an average per-pupil cost (APPC) approach.130
APPC is calculated by combining the funds that the local school
district receives from the SEA and from local taxes and dividing that
sum by the school district’s enrollment. The resulting dividend travels
with the student to the charter school. The rationale behind this
funding mechanism is that APPC successfully approximates both the
cost to the state and local government of the student’s education, and
the amount property-owning parents pay in taxes.
In theory, when parents choose to send their child to a charter
school, they shift money away from the sending public school to the
receiving charter school. Thus, the rationale goes, the charter school
should receive the same amount that the state would have spent on
the child if she had attended a traditional public school. States differ
in how they allocate APPC funds, mainly in the percentage of APPC
to which charter schools are entitled, what “administrative fees” a
sending school district may be entitled to withhold, whether a sending
school district should receive “impact aid,” and who controls the flow
of funds to schools.

1.

Percentage of APPC

State enabling statutes generally take one of three approaches in
allocating APPC to charter schools. The majority of states allocate
100% of all state and local education funds based on APPC to charter
schools. 131 Eight states set statutory minimums for APPC allocations,
the lowest at 75%, but give discretion to school districts and the SEA
to exceed the minimums up to the full amount of APPC funding.132
Finally, some states give maximum discretion to school districts and
state education agencies by requiring charter school applicants to
negotiate the level of public funding they need for the school. 133 In
Wisconsin and Florida, the negotiation process may be beneficial to
charter schools, as state statutes authorize school districts to exceed
public school funding levels. 134 Finally, some states distinguish
between granting state aid versus local property tax revenue,

130. 50-State Comparison, supra note 56.
131. CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33.
132. See generally id. (Colorado, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Pennsylvania).
133. See generally id. (Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Kansas, and Virginia).
134. See generally id. (Wisconsin and Florida).

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

98

[Vol. XLVI

depending on whether the charter school was authorized by a state
agency versus a school district or local entity. 135
There are several flaws with APPC systems. First, as analyzed
below, even states that can (or must) provide full funding often do not
do so. For example, California schools must receive “operational
funding that is equal to the total funding that would be available to a
similar school district serving a similar pupil population.” 136 But
charter schools have administrative fees, rent, and other processing
costs that traditional public schools do not have to pay. If the initial
funding provided is equal per the clause quoted above, but charter
schools bear costs public schools do not, this results in a 29.3%
funding gap between charter schools and public schools in
California. 137
A second flaw is found in states that require charter school
applicants and the local school board or SEAs to negotiate over the
appropriate funding level. This structure ignores the inherent power
imbalance between the applicant and the government entity. 138 Since
local school boards and charter schools compete for funding and
students, the local school board has a direct interest in underfunding
the charter school by requiring payment of high fees for its services.139
Moreover, because state laws are either vaguely drafted or designed
to protect public schools from losing money, charter schools are often
shortchanged. 140 Thus, while APPC may be the best proxy to
determine the appropriate level of operational funding for a charter
school on a theoretical level, in reality it often leaves charter schools
without the funds they need to flourish.

2.

Administrative Fees and Impact Aid

States’ enabling statutes differ on the extent to which a school
district can withhold administrative costs from the APPC.
Administrative costs include reasonable fees for using school district
services to operate the charter school, such as processing reporting
requirements, providing tests, and other services that must be
administered by the school district. Six states currently permit

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See generally id. (Texas, South Carolina, and Georgia).
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47630(a) (West 2008).
INEQUITY EXPANDS, supra note 5, at 15.
CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING GAP, supra note 12, at 5–6.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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withholding up to 5% of the APPC for administrative fees. 141 In
states that require the local school board or SEA to negotiate
appropriate funding levels with the charter school, such
administrative fees are presumed to be negotiated. 142
When a charter school enrolls a student that previously attended a
public school, the school district may lose operational revenue it
needs to pay for fixed contracts and other long-term expenditures.143
To combat this problem, several states have enacted “impact fees,”
which require the SEA to continue funding both the sending public
school and receiving charter school, while it slowly reduces the level
of aid to the sending public school over a period of three years.144
Such laws are designed to soften the financial blow to public schools
for students choosing charter schools.
In addition to the bargaining power issue raised above, states often
take administrative fees at face value rather than requiring an actual
accounting of school district expenditures for services provided to a
charter school. 145 Some school districts, especially those who act as
the LEA for the charter school, must prepare reports for state and
federal agencies regarding school progress and administration. 146 In
reality, charter school operators often prepare some portion of these
reports, yet charter schools must pay the school district administrative
fees for the whole report. 147
Another funding challenge charter schools face is “hold harmless”
clauses, which allow school districts to withhold funds allotted to a
charter school if the school district finds that it is owed payment for
administrative costs. 148 These costs can be substantial; for example,

141. CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33 (Rhode Island, Oklahoma, Ohio, New
Mexico, Maryland, and Florida).
142. See supra notes 108 and 109.
143. See supra notes 57 and 58.
144. CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33 (Florida, Massachusetts, New York,
Rhode Island, and Utah).
145. See generally CAL. STATE AUDITOR, CHARTER SCHOOLS: SOME SCHOOL
DISTRICTS IMPROPERLY AUTHORIZED AND INADEQUATELY MONITORED OUT-OFDISTRICT CHARTER SCHOOLS (2017), https://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2016141.pdf [https://perma.cc/YBM2-FE2J].
146. Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. CHARTER SCHOOLS ASS’N,
http://www.ccsa.org/understanding/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/2SAS-78MG].
147. John Fensterwald, The Big Burden of Charter School Oversight, EDSOURCE
(Dec. 6, 2016), https://edsource.org/2016/big-burdens-of-charter-school-oversightccsa-carsnet/573868 [https://perma.cc/XAU2-LY9E].
148. See School Funding Practices Keep Dollars in Districts for “Phantom
Students,” EDUC. NEXT (May 1, 2013), https://www.educationnext.org/school-
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charter schools in St. Louis have reported a 15% shortfall in funding
as a result of administrative fees withheld by the local school board. 149
Moreover, courts have held that charter schools must share the cost
of remedial orders, such as desegregation orders, that were in effect at
the time the school received its charter. 150 Because state statutes do
not penalize school districts for withholding funds, charter schools are
left with little administrative or private remedy.
Ultimately, all these clauses, fees, and impact aid erode the general
purpose of charter schools: to force traditional public schools to
innovate and become more competitive. By effectively giving
traditional public schools more money when a student transfers to a
charter school, school districts have little financial incentive to
restructure.

3.

Funds Flow

State APPC allocations can also be distinguished by considering
who controls the flow of funds. State education agencies receive a
significant amount of money from programs tied to federal
legislation, such as Title I of the ESEA, IDEA, and other general
block grants from the federal government. 151 State legislatures also
allocate general funds to support education, which are distributed
through state education agencies. 152 Finally, local governments in
some states levy property and other taxes, and distribute such
revenues to local school districts. 153 This amalgamation of funding
sources and schemes has generated a variety of flow structures for
charter school funding.
The majority of states allocate all federal and state aid to LEAs,
who then allocate the funds through APPC to charter schools. 154 A

funding-practices-keep-dollars-in-districts-for-%E2%80%9Cphantomstudents%E2%80%9D/ [https://perma.cc/QDE5-GQWX].
149. See David Hunn & Steve Geigerich, Charter, Public Schools in Funding
Dispute, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 3, 2007) [https://perma.cc/AS9Z-A3BH].
150. See Jenkins v. Kan. City Mo. Sch. Dist., 516 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2008).
151. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEARS 2017–2019 STATE TABLES FOR THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
EDUCATION
(2018),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/statetables/index.html
[https://perma.cc/25FB-A8LX].
152. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Public School Revenue Sources, in THE
CONDITION
OF
EDUCATION
(2018),
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cma.asp [https://perma.cc/JV7U-5NGU].
153. Id.
154. See CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33 (California, Iowa, District of
Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
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minority of states take the opposite approach and rely solely on the
SEA to allocate funds to charter schools. 155 Several states bifurcate
state and local APPC allocations, requiring both the state and local
school district to give charter schools their respective share. 156 Other
states allocate funds depending on whether the authorizing entity was
a SEA, a local school district, or private entity. 157 Finally, some states
authorize charter schools to form as their own LEA, allowing them to
receive federal and state aid directly, even in states that place control
of the funds flow in the hands of the school district. 158
Several studies have found that the flow of funds a charter school
receives greatly impacts the equity of a charter school’s funding,
especially for federal funds. Among states that grant full local
education agency status to charter schools are Minnesota and the
District of Columbia, where charter schools received $1,083 and
$1,448 per pupil in federal aid, respectively. 159 In 2011, Minnesota’s
charter schools received $1,167 per pupil in federal funding, 160 while
charter schools in the District of Columbia received $3,016 per pupil
in federal funding. 161 By contrast, states such as Colorado, Florida,
and Illinois, where charter schools cannot form as local education
agencies, received $412, 162 $645, 163 and $922, 164 respectively, per pupil
in federal aid in 2011. Missouri provides an even better example of
the importance of local education agency status for charter schools:
prior to amending its charter school law in 2006 to allow charter
schools to form as local education agencies, Missouri charter schools
received 28.8% percent less funding than traditional public schools.165
After the amendment, Missouri charter schools received 3% more
funding compared to traditional public schools in 2011. 166 Charter
schools that become LEAs take on greater responsibility to educate
York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming).
155. Id. (Delaware, New Hampshire, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nevada, and Ohio).
156. Id. (Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas,
and Utah).
157. Id. (Georgia, Missouri, Michigan, Connecticut, Colorado, Arkansas, Arizona,
and Alaska).
158. Osberg, supra note 57, at 59.
159. Id.
160. INEQUITY EXPANDS, supra note 5, at 223.
161. Id. at 359.
162. Id. at 83.
163. Id. at 118.
164. Id. at 161.
165. INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at 1.
166. Id. at 15.
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students with special needs and socioeconomic challenges and are
subject to greater reporting requirements, but the difference in
funding is profound.
B.

1.

Start-Up Funding

Public Charter Schools Program

ESSA gives states the flexibility to adopt a variety of assessments
while preserving NCLB’s annual assessment requirement. 167 Charter
schools in each state can be held accountable to goals and progress
targets set by the state. 168 Under ESSA, schools that fail to meet the
state’s benchmarks will face intervention, and possible closure,
according to the state’s charter school law. 169 ESSA is intended to
remove, to the greatest extent possible, federal micromanagement of
state charter school accountability standards. 170 These accountability
measures for failing charter schools focus on a policy holding that
parents deserve to choose where their child is educated, which is
different from other reform efforts that target desegregation and
equitable school funding. 171
To improve school choice, the Public Charter Schools Program
(PCSP) provides competitive grants to SEAs who, in turn, allocate
these funds to LEAs to help the planning, program design, and initial
implementation of new charter schools. 172 The federal Department
of Education provides dissemination grants to charter schools that
have “demonstrated ‘overall success,’ including academic
achievement, high level of parental satisfaction, and strong
If the SEA chooses not to
management and leadership.” 173

167.
1802.
168.
1802.
169.
1802.
170.
171.

Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-95 §1111(b)(2), 129 Stat.
Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-95 §1111I(4)(C), 129 Stat.
Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-95 §1111(d)(1)(B), 129 Stat.

See 20 U.S.C. § 7371 (2015).
See Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, Charter Schools Under the
NCLB: Choice and Equal Opportunity, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 165 (2007)

(arguing that charter schools represent a new paradigm for equal protection).
172. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS
PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT (2004), https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/choice/pcspfinal/finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8S2-TKLE].
173. Id.
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participate in the PCSP, individual charter school developers may
apply directly to the Department of Education for a grant. 174
The ESSA expanded state-level charter school grants by creating a
competitive application process for state education agencies.175
Through the competitive grants, state education agencies are
encouraged to adopt ambitious charter school objectives and to give
charter schools a greater degree of flexibility. 176 In 2016, the
Department of Education awarded $206 million in grants under this
competitive grant program, resulting in the expansion of charter
school programs in California, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts,
Tennessee, and Washington. 177 The competitive grant process will
ideally result in greater public awareness of the mission of the charter
school movement, which is to improve school choice for students and
parents and to achieve equitable funding for charter schools on par
with traditional public schools.

2.

State Categorical Grants

Many studies have identified inadequate start-up funding for
textbooks, computers, and equipment as a barrier to charter school
creation. 178 Lack of start-up funding especially hurts charter schools
created by parents and communities, because they often lack the
resources of large network charter schools or those managed by
better-financed private companies. 179
Federal funding under the PCSP has alleviated some of the
concerns over start-up funding and, with the exception of Maryland
and Missouri, every state and the District of Columbia offer federal
start-up funds. 180 To supplement PCSP grants, some state education
agencies also provide grants 181 or low- or zero-interest loans.182 For

174. Id.
175. 20 U.S.C.A. § 7221b(b) (West 2018).
176. 20 U.S.C.A. § 7221b(g) (West 2018).
177. Charter School Program State Educational Agencies (SEA) Awards, U.S.
DEP’T EDUC. OFF. INNOVATION & IMPROVEMENT, https://innovation.ed.gov/what-wedo/charter-schools/charter-school-program-state-educational-agencies-sea/awards/
[https://perma.cc/V2MD-Q9CP].
178. VENTURESOME CAPITAL, supra note 46, at 7.
179. Id. at 19.
180. Charter Schools: Does the State Provide Start-Up or Planning Grants to New
Charter Schools? 50-State Comparison, EDUC. COMMISSION OF THE STATES (Jan.
2018),
http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestNB2C?rep=CS1718
[https://perma.cc/KVM7-RWMZ].
181. Id. (Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and
Utah).
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example, Minnesota charter schools are eligible for aid to pay start-up
costs and additional operating costs in the amount of $500 per
student, in addition to a minimum of fifty thousand dollars $50,000
per school. 183 In Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, state
legislatures created a state stimulus fund for charter school start-up
and facility’s needs. 184 Indiana also awards grants to new charter
schools and charter schools with growing enrollments to allow the
school to scale up. 185 Some states provide aid contingent upon a lack
of available federal funds. 186 However, due to the existence of
federal aid, at least one state legislature has declined to fund these
programs. 187
C.

Facilities

The rising costs of facilities for charter schools have garnered
increased attention because of the schools’ lack of financing
options. 188 Facilities can be a costly problem for charter schools for
several reasons. First, former public-school buildings that are in good
condition and a suitable location are rarely available. Second, such
buildings must often be remodeled or otherwise adapted to the needs
of the charter school. Many charter schools start with one grade and
plan to expand incrementally until they can serve a full range of
grades; moving locations repeatedly is a costly distraction, and schools
would be better served by settling into a long-term lease.
Another set of issues arises when it comes to large-scale financing.
Low-cost, low-rate loans and mortgages for large sums of money are
often hard to come by, 189 and charter schools are perceived as a risk
in the public capital market, adding additional expenses. 190 Charter

182. Id. (California, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, New Mexico, and Oklahoma).
183. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 124E.20 (2018).
184. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-188 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-14 (West
2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3-144 (West 2018).
185. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-49-9-1 et seq. (West 2018) (Charter and Innovation
School Advance Program).
186. See 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77.1-4 (West 2018).
187. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. CODE § 2856 (West 2018).
188. See N.Y. UNIV. STEINHARDT SCH. OF EDUC. INST. FOR EDUC. & SOC. POLICY,
THE FINANCE GAP: CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THEIR FACILITIES (2004),
https://steinhardt.nyu.edu/scmsAdmin/uploads/001/117/FinanceGap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/76HF-9LKK].
189. KAUFFMAN FOUND., DEBUNKING THE REAL ESTATE RISK OF CHARTER
SCHOOLS (2005), https://www.edreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/DebunkingReal-Estate-Risk-Charter-Schools.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKK8-4X9D].
190. Id. at 1–2.
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schools attempting to obtain funding in order to improve existing
facilities or begin construction on new ones are hindered by perceived
risks in granting bond financing, by inequities and ambiguities in
statutes and tax regulations, and by hostile or unsupportive political
environments. 191 A private non-profit lending sector has emerged to
cope with the increasing capital demands of charter schools, but it is
still small, and non-profit lenders remain just as wary as for-profit
lenders about charter school stability. 192 This has led the federal
government and several states to develop state charter school
facilities aid programs and to establish public-private partnerships to
create innovative financing models.

1.

Federal Programs

Charter schools rely on several federal programs to improve or
build facilities. The Department of Education operates two grant
programs: the Credit Enhancement for Charter School Facilities
Program (Credit Enhancement program) 193 and the State Charter
School Facilities Incentive Grants Program (Incentive Grants
program). 194 Additionally, PCSP provides leverage funds through the
Credit Enhancement for Charter School Facilities Program. 195 Under
the Credit Enhancement program, public and nonprofit entities can
compete to receive and leverage federal funds to help charter schools
obtain school facilities through purchase, lease, donation,
construction, and renovate of school facilities. 196 Grant recipients
may, among other things, receive funds to guarantee and insure
physical plant debt and leases for personal and real property. They
also help obtain financing for a charter school’s facilities by

191. INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at 13–15; INEQUITY EXPANDS,
supra note 5, at 34–37.
192. See LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., 2014 CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY

FINANCE
LANDSCAPE
2
(2007),
http://www.lisc.org/media/filer_public/59/38/5938b90b-07cc-411c-845f431f50a4682e/2014csflandscape.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP97-BN3E].
193. 20 U.S.C. § 7221c (2018); see also 2014 CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCE,
supra note 192, at 3.
194. Id.
195. Credit Enhancement for Charter School Facilities Program Description, U.S.
DEP’T EDUC. (2018), https://innovation.ed.gov/what-we-do/charter-schools/creditenhancement-for-charter-school-facilities-program/ [https://perma.cc/F2XS-SYCM].
This program gives charter schools money for the sole purpose of guaranteeing the
school’s debts, so that the school is a more acceptable credit risk for potential lenders.
Id.; see also 2014 CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCE, supra note 192, at 29.
196. Credit Enhancement for Charter School Facilities Program Description, supra
note 195.
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identifying potential lending sources, by encouraging private lending,
and through other similar activities. Finally, they establish charter
school facility “incubators” that new charter schools can use until
they acquire a facility of their own. 197 The program is designed to
meet the perceived lack of facilities funding available to charter
schools. 198
The federal government also operates the State Charter School
Facilities Incentive Grants program to assist charter schools with
facility costs. Through the Incentive Grants program, the federal
government provides funds to states so that they can establish and
administer per-pupil facilities aid programs. 199 Currently, fourteen
states provide some form of per-pupil facilities aid for charter
schools. 200 The Incentive Grants program is intended “to encourage
more states to develop and expand per-pupil facilities aid programs”
by covering a part of the states’ share in the costs associated with
charter schools facilities funding. 201 The Center for Education
Reform has hailed a per-pupil expenditure as a model aid to
encourage development of charter school facilities. 202
In addition to the two grant programs administered by the
Department of Education, the federal government oversees various
other programs for charter schools to tap into to finance facilities’
needs. Many charter schools receive distributions from the Treasury
Department’s New Markets Tax Credit Program (NMTC), which

197. Id.
198. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A COMMITMENT TO QUALITY: NATIONAL CHARTER
SCHOOL
POLICY
FORUM
REPORT
4
(2008),
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/csforum/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJD2WC7C] (calling for additional facilities financing for charter schools); see also 2014
CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCE, supra note 192, at 29.
199. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATE CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITIES INCENTIVE
GRANTS
PROGRAM
DESCRIPTION,
http://www.ed.gov/programs/statecharter/gtepstatecharter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CXL9-Z4SX].
200. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 17078.52–.66 (West 2018); D.C. CODE § 38-2908
(2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.22(d) (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-5-103
(West 2018); AK STAT. ANN. § 14.11.126 (West 2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-188
(West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-43.7-110.3 (West 2018); FL. STAT. ANN. § 1013.62
(West 2018); GEORGIA STAT ANN. § 20-2-2068.2 (West 2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 335208 (West 2018); IND. CODE § 20-24-7-11 and § 20-24-12-5 (West 2018); LA. CODE §
3995 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS 69 § 1M (West 2018); MISS. STAT. §37-41-1 et seq.
(West 2018); OHIO REV. CODE § 3318.50 (West 2018); OK. STAT. ANN. § 3-144 (West
2018); 24 PENN. STAT. § 17-1731-A (West 2018); TENN. CODE § 49-13-112 (West 2018).
201. See supra note 157.
202. CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING GAP, supra note 12, at 5.
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encourages private sector investments in distressed communities.203
Operated through the Community Development Financial
Institutions Fund (CDFI), NMTC provides a credit against Federal
income taxes for investors that make “qualified equity investments”
in “community development entities” (CDE). 204 CDFI allocates a
certain number of tax credits to CDEs who, in turn, offer the credits
to investors in exchange for a “qualified equity investment” in the
CDE. 205 The CDE then uses the proceeds of these investments to
make “qualified low-income community investments” in “qualified
active low-income community businesses” (QALICB), which are
typically businesses and real estate projects located in targeted lowincome communities. 206 Out of the $3.5 billion that the Treasury
Department allocated to various CDEs for distribution in 2017, CDFI
allocated $800 million to eight non-profit lenders that have funded
charter schools as QALICBs for capital improvement projects.207
The General Accounting Office credited NMTC for increasing
private investment in low-income communities. 208 NMTC allows
charter schools located in low-income communities a route to attract
investors and receive low-cost private financing. Since 2008, the

203. Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §121
(West). NMTC is codified in § 45D of the Internal Revenue Code.
204. The credit is taken over a seven-year period, amounting to five percent for the
first three years and six percent for the final four, totaling a substantial 39% of the
total original investment. I.R.C. § 45D(a). For example, if CDFI allocates $1 million
to a CDE, who offers the tax credit to investor for a $1 million equity investment in a
QALICB, the investor will receive a $50,000 tax credit for the first three years and a
$60,000 tax credit for the next four, totaling $390,000 in total tax credits over the life
of the investment. See CMTY. DEV. FIN. INSTS. FUND, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT
PROGRAM
2017
APPLICATION
INSTRUCTIONS
(2017),
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/2017%20Online%20Application%20Instruction
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/DEY3-MPDA].
205. I.R.C. § 45D(b).
206. I.R.C. § 45D(d) (“qualified low-income investment”); I.R.C. § 45D(d)(2)
(QALICB); I.R.C. § 45D(e) (defining “low-income community” to mean any census
tract if (a) the poverty rate is at least 20%, (b) if tract not located in metropolitan
area, the median family income does not exceed 80% of statewide median family
income, or (c) if tract located in metropolitan area, the median family income does
not exceed 80% of the statewide or metropolitan family income).
207. See 2014 CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCE LANDSCAPE, supra note 192,
at 34.
208. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT APPEARS
TO INCREASE INVESTMENT BY INVESTORS IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES, BUT
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO BETTER MONITOR COMPLIANCE 4 (2007),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07296.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4J7-RJLS].
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NMTC program has injected over $1.894 billion into charter schools
in low-income communities. 209
Finally, the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Development’s
Community (RDC) Program provides loans, guarantees, and grants
for essential community facilities in rural areas and in towns up to
20,000 in population. 210 Guaranteed and direct loan funds may be
used for construction, renovation, or improvement of facilities, as well
as refinancing in certain cases. 211 As of 2013, the RDC has provided
loans, guarantees, and grants totaling $510.1 million for charter school
projects in thirteen states. 212

2.

State Programs

State facilities funding programs come in a variety of forms. States
usually require either the SEA or local school districts to maintain a
list of vacant or underutilized buildings suitable to house charter
schools. 213 Some states, such as Delaware, have enacted provisions
that require the government entity that owns the building to give
charter schools the right of first refusal for purchase and lease.214
These provisions also often include clauses that require the
government owner to negotiate “in good faith” or use the “fair
market value” when selling, purchasing or leasing the property.215
The District of Columbia, for example, gives charter schools a 25%
discount from the “non-profit rate” when selling vacant or unused
buildings to charter schools. 216 Florida gives land developers the
option of providing charter school facilities in a new development as
an alternative to paying impact fees to the local school district.217
Further, several states require that school districts provide

209. Charter School Facility Financing: New Markets Tax Credit Program, LOCAL
INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP. (2017), http://www.lisc.org/charter-schools/fundingoptions/us-department-treasury/new-markets-tax-credit-program/
[https://perma.cc/J5UW-WLP3].
210. See Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. §
1926(a)(1) (2018).
211. See 2014 CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCE LANDSCAPE, supra note 192,
at 35.
212. Id.
213. CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33 (Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Louisiana, Nevada, New York, Oregon, South
Carolina, and Virginia).
214. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 504A(6) (West 2018).
215. Id.
216. D.C. CODE § 38-1802.09 (2018).
217. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.33(18)(f) (West 2018).
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“equivalent facilities” to charter schools and public schools, which
allows charter schools to pay only ordinary maintenance costs and
possibly below market rent. 218 More often than not, all of these
various aid programs apply only to charter schools that utilize old
school district buildings. These policies are intended to place
underutilized school and government building back in productive use,
as well as to help charter schools with their facilities financing.
Despite policies that make unused school buildings available to
charter schools, possibly free of charge, facilities maintenance, repair,
and renovation can still be costly. To address this, several states
created programs that grant aid to charter schools on a per-pupil
basis, which is intended to cover the cost of rent, maintenance, and
repair. 219 For example, Minnesota provides the lesser of $1,314 per
pupil or 90% of the actual lease costs in order to cover their facilities
Other state aid programs target renovation,
expenditures. 220
remodeling, and new construction costs by providing grants to charter
schools directly. 221 Alternatively, rather than create a separate
charter school facilities aid program, Hawaii and North Carolina
permit charter schools to apply for facilities aid normally reserved for
public schools. 222
Finally, the state might help charter schools with facilities funding
by granting charter schools limited access to public debt financing.
Some states have given special state governmental authorities the
power to issue low interest loans or bonds on behalf of a charter
school. 223 Other states have authorized local government units,
mostly school districts and cities, to issue bonds on behalf of the

218. CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33, at 14 (California’s Proposition 39).
219. See id. at 15, 17, 27, 49, 57, 63, 65, 73, 75, 91 (California, Colorado, Georgia,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and Wyoming).
220. MINN. STAT. § 124E.22(c) (West 2018).
221. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-188 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5402 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-14 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3144 (West 2018).
222. HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1502.4(b) (2018) (allowing non-profit and for-profit
entities to apply for an allocation through Hawaii’s 3R’s school repair and
maintenance fund); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159D-35 et seq. (2018) (Private Capital
Facilities Finance Act allows non-profit elementary and secondary schools to apply
for facilities grants and low-cost loans).
223. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-15-101 et seq. (2018) (Colorado Educational
and Cultural Facilities Authority); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-176 et seq. (2018)
(Connecticut Health and Educational Facilities Authority); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
3501/805-5 (2018) (Illinois Finance Authority Act); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
12.192(VI)(A) (2018) (Michigan Public Educational Facilities Authority).
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charter school. 224 Alternatively, states might allow charter schools to
participate in local bond elections for public school facilities.225
Finally, Arizona and Delaware consider charter schools as economic
development programs and allow them to apply for industrial
development bonds through the local government. 226 All of these
policies allow charter schools to access public debt by creating or
utilizing an intermediary governmental authority for the purpose of
securing issued bonds.

3.

Local Programs

Public school districts typically rely on local taxes for a significant
portion of their budgets, and on bonds issued by the local school
district for financial capital improvements to facilities. By contrast,
charter schools receive almost 70% of their funding from the state, on
average, with the remainder coming from federal funds distributed
through state education authorities. 227 Several states even deny
charter schools access to local funds, though they attempt to
compensate for this by granting access to state funds. 228 In Inequity’s
Next Frontier, Inequity Persists, and Inequity Expands, the authors
found that, in practice, most local governments do not allow charter
schools to access local tax revenue for operational or facilities
funds. 229 As discussed above, states have attempted to make up for
this gap by providing additional funds and debt financing methods,
but states still grant only partial access to local funding.
An interesting public-private partnership has developed in
Indianapolis, Indiana. Indianapolis is the only city in the country
where the mayor’s office acts as the primary authorizer of local
charter schools. 230 In 2002, the Indianapolis Mayor’s Charter Schools
Office and the Indianapolis Local Public Improvement Bond Bank, in
partnership with the Annie E. Casey Foundation, JPMorgan Chase
Bank, and Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), developed a

224. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-404(2)(a) (2018).
225. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-404(1)(a) (2018).
226. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 (West 2018) (allowing counties, cities,
school districts, and other political subdivisions that support industrial development
to represent a charter school); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 29, § 5051 et seq. (West 2018)
(Delaware Economic Development Authority).
227. Osberg, supra note 57, at 55, 58–59.
228. Id. at 55–56.
229. See INEQUITY’S NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 5, at 15–16; INEQUITY PERSISTS,
supra note 5, at 11–13; INEQUITY EXPANDS, supra note 5, at 34–36.
230. See IND. CODE §§ 20-24-2.3-3.1 to -3.5 (2018).
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facilities loan program for Mayor-sponsored charter schools. 231 The
Bond Bank serves as a conduit for a $20 million loan from JPMorgan
Chase Bank and relends the proceeds to individual schools. 232 The
City of Indianapolis attaches a moral obligation clause to guarantee
all of the loans made to charter schools, while LISC and the Annie E.
Casey Foundation provide additional limited guarantees — this gives
charter schools access to tax-exempt debt at rates that benefit from
the City’s AAA credit rating. 233 This type of partnership between
non-profit, for-profit, and government entities may be a sign of future
integration between private and public debt markets to support public
initiatives.
D. At-Risk Youth Programs
Charter schools typically serve a disproportionate number of socioeconomically disadvantaged students that qualify for both federal and
state aid programs. 234 Despite this, charter schools receive less of the
funding attached to federal and state aid programs because local
school districts control the flow of funds as LEAs or state grant
recipients, leaving charter schools in a poor negotiating position to
ask for increased funding. 235
Title I of the ESEA establishes a framework for federal support,
and creates accountability for schools, LEAs, and SEAs. 236 It offers
financial support for schools educating children from low-income
families 237 and is one of the most heavily funded federal education
programs. Because of the high correlation between poverty and low
academic achievement, supporting economically disadvantaged
students is a central concern of the government. 238 The purpose of
Title I is “to provide all children significant opportunity to receive a
fair, equitable, and high-quality education[.]” 239

2014 CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCE LANDSCAPE, supra note 192, at 48.
Id.
Id.
See Improving Basic Programs Operated by Local Educational Agencies
(Title I, Part A) Program Description, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
231.
232.
233.
234.

https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/index.html
[hereinafter Improving Basic Programs].
235. See id.
236. See generally id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2018).

[https://perma.cc/LAU3-7K6J]
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Title I grants funding that may be used for additional staff,
professional development, extended-time programs, and other
strategies that raise student achievement in high-poverty schools. 240
Schools are not required to participate in Title I unless they want to
receive additional funds. Grants are made to LEAs based on the
number of economically disadvantaged children in each education
agency’s school district. 241 Recent studies have found that grants to
SEAs vary between states, and that grants to LEAs within states also
differ, creating wide disparities in Title I funding for at-risk youth. 242
Title I defines charter schools as including both elementary and
secondary schools. 243 However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit validated a Department of Education policy that declared forprofit charter schools ineligible to receive federal funding under
IDEA and ESEA. 244 As discussed earlier, whether a charter school
can organize as a LEA has a profound effect on the amount of money
it will actually receive in Title I funds: charter schools tied to LEAs
receive around 4% more money than unassociated charter schools. 245
State programs vary depending upon the infrastructure of at-risk
youth programs already in place. Some states require the school
district to administer all categorical aid programs to charter schools,
who must negotiate the appropriate level of service and the extent to
which the charter school itself will provide services. 246 This is
particularly the case for free-and-reduced lunch programs as some
charter schools lack the facilities necessary to house a cafeteria.
Other states allow charter schools to compete with other public
schools for categorical funds that target at-risk youth. 247 Finally, very
few states have at-risk youth programs specifically for charter schools,

240. See generally Improving Basic Programs, supra note 234.
241. 20 U.S.C. § 6333(a), (c) (2018). Local education agencies are a “public board
of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for either
administrative control or direction of . . . public elementary schools or secondary
schools.” 20 U.S.C. § 7801(30)(a) (2018); see also supra Section III.A.
242. See Goodwin Liu, Improving Title I Funding Across States, Districts, and
Schools, 93 IOWA L. REV. 973, 993–94 (2008).
243. 20 U.S.C. § 7801(19), (45) (2018).
244. See Ariz. State Bd. for Charter Sch. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003,
1010 (9th Cir. 2006); see Evans, supra note 11, at 640. While the ruling only applies
to for-profit charter schools, there is some question as to whether the Department’s
policy will chill the growth of charter schools across the country. See id. at 641–43.
245. See supra Section III.A.3.
246. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71B, § 14 (2018); see generally MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 71, § 89 (2018).
247. See, e.g., ESEA Competitive Grant Programs, WIS. DEP’T PUB. INSTRUCTION,
https://dpi.wi.gov/esea/historical/funding/competitive [https://perma.cc/6XUD-3SD6].

2019]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

113

which allow charter schools to have automatically increased funding
for students that qualify for such aid. Such programs typically exist in
states where charter schools serving at-risk youth are favored over
schools serving non-qualifying students.
E.

Special Education

IDEA provides the framework within which public schools provide
special education. IDEA is premised on the fact that it is almost
twice as expensive to educate a child with special needs compared to
a child without such needs. 248 To ease this financial burden, IDEA
facilitates distribution of federal funds to SEAs based on a state
appropriation formula. 249 The SEAs then make sub-grants to LEAs
to pay for “free and appropriate public education” (FAPE) for
special needs children. 250 While state participation in the program is
not mandatory, the federal government provides a significant
financial incentive for states to participate by subsidizing the cost of
providing FAPE for children with disabilities. 251
To be eligible for IDEA funds, state and local education agencies
must ensure that all eligible students are receiving FAPE. 252 Local
school officials must work together with parents, counselors, and
other professionals to create an “individualized education plan”
(IEP) for every qualifying student. 253 Students must also be taught in
the “least restrictive environment” such that, to the maximum extent
appropriate, children with disabilities should be educated alongside
children without disabilities.254 IDEA thus obligates school districts
to support education for students with disabilities even if the cost of
doing so is far higher than the cost of supporting non-disabled
students. IDEA has generated a considerable volume of litigation. 255

248. See NANCY LEE JONES ET AL., INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION
ACT (IDEA): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 117 (2004).
249. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(d) (2018); see JONES ET AL., supra note 248, at 45.
250. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(f)(1), (3) (2018); see JONES ET AL., supra note 248, at 87.
251. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)–(2) (2018); see also Dixie Snow Huefner,
Updating the FAPE Standard Under IDEA, 37 J. L. & EDUC. 367 (2008) (examining
the Supreme Court’s Rowley decision’s impact on the FAPE standard); H.
RUTHERFORD TURNBULL, III, FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE LAW
AND CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES (4th ed. 1993).
252. Grants to States for Education of Children with Disabilities Program
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.
(2016),
Description,
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/osepgts/index.html [https://perma.cc/H7NS-QS4V].
253. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)–(2)(A) (2018).
254. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2018).
255. See generally Huefner, supra note 251.

114

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

Similar to ESEA, IDEA includes public charter schools in its
definitions of “elementary school” and “secondary school,” 256 but the
Department of Education has promulgated regulations limiting the
act to cover only non-profit charter schools. 257
Money allocated under IDEA is distributed from the federal
government to SEAs, which allocate the funds to the LEAs
responsible for providing the special education services to students. 258
At the local level, the challenge of implementing special education in
charter schools stems from an inherent tension between special
education and parental choice — how to reconcile parent choice with
centralized special education team decision making.
This is
exacerbated by special education regulations and charter school laws
that exempt charter schools from regulations. 259 Special education
funding is a sensitive topic in school finance, and the various
mechanisms designed by state legislatures to fund special education
reflect the underlying frustration of school districts, who pay a
significant portion of special education costs from general operation
funds because special education resources are essentially
underfunded by state and federal mandates. 260
Due to their small size, low enrollments, limited staff, and targeting
of at-risk youth, charter schools may be disproportionately affected
by the costs associated with special education. 261 The high costs of
special education could diminish, if not altogether destroy, a charter
school’s ability to operate effectively. 262 Expenditures for “high
need” or “high cost” students can exceed thirteen times that of a
general education student. 263 Also, because most charter school

256. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(6), (27) (2018).
257. See supra note 27.
258. See CTR. FOR IDEA FISCAL REPORTING, QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE ON THE
ALLOCATION OF IDEA PART B SUBGRANTS TO LOCAL EDUCATION AGENCIES 1
(2017),
https://cifr.wested.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CIFR-QRG-LEAAllocations.pdf [https://perma.cc/J347-VGKV].
259. See EILEEN M. AHEARN ET AL., PROJECT SEARCH: SPECIAL EDUCATION AS
REQUIREMENTS IN CHARTER SCHOOLS, FINAL REPORT OF A RESEARCH STUDY 43
(2001),
http://www.nasdse.org/Portals/0/Documents/ProjectSearch.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UW2S-FTVH] [hereinafter PROJECT SEARCH].
260. VENTURESOME CAPITAL, supra note 46, at 38.
261. See PROJECT SEARCH, supra note 259, at 4–5.
262. See id. at 38; see also J.P. Heubert, Schools Without Rules? Charter Schools,
Federal Disability Law, and the Paradoxes of Deregulation, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 301 (1997).
263. OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. AND REHAB. SERVS., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., A NEW
ERA: REVITALIZING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES
(2002),
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admissions use a lottery system and target at-risk youth, a school may
have a disproportionate number of special needs or undiagnosed
special needs applicants compared to other schools in the state or
district. 264 While some states have special funds for high-cost
students, a significant portion of the underfunded costs are borne by
the school. 265 As a result, several studies have documented that
charter schools “struggle to amass the fiscal and human capacity” to
comply with federal and state law. 266
State statutes often do not explicitly dictate how special education
funds should be distributed to charter schools. In ten states, the
charter school law is silent regarding special education funding. 267 A
slew of state laws simply reiterate IDEA’s language mandating that
students with disabilities receive a “proportionate” or
“commensurate” share of federal and state special education funds. 268
Some states take a different approach. Massachusetts, for example,
has specific provisions that limit a charter school’s fiscal responsibility
for students who attend the school but do not require placement in a
separate day or residential living environment. 269 All states use
various funding formulas based on the number of special education
children in the school, the type of disability, grade, level of service
needs, or total student population. 270 Barring specific language, the
flow of special education funds largely depends on whether a charter
school is organized as a LEA.
States have developed three models to fund special education in
charter schools, which depend on whether the school is chartered as a

http://ectacenter.org/~pdfs/calls/2010/earlypartc/revitalizing_special_education.pdf
[https://perma.cc/93AQ-EXTK].
264. See LAUREN M. RHIM & MARGARET J. MCLAUGHLIN, CHARTER SCHOOLS
AND
SPECIAL EDUCATION: BALANCING DISPARATE VISIONS 4 (2000),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED444297.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP4D-JQNM].
265. See MICHAEL GRIFFITH, STATE FUNDING PROGRAMS FOR HIGH-COST
SPECIAL
EDUCATION
STUDENTS
(2008),
http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/78/10/7810.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZMB-WBZS].
266. See, e.g., PROJECT SEARCH, supra note 259, at 33; Cassandra Guarino &
Derrick Chau, Special Education in Charter and Conventional Public Schools, in
CHARTER SCHOOL OPERATIONS AND PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA
161–73 (R. Zimmer et al. eds., 2003).
267. Lauren M. Rhim et al., Charter School Statutes and Special Education: Policy
Answers or Policy Ambiguity?, 41 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 50, 57 (2007) (Arkansas, Hawaii,
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin).
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 71, § 89 (West 2018).
270. PROJECT SEARCH, supra note 259, at 23.
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LEA. 271
If a charter school is its own LEA, or operates
independently from the local school district, then it assumes the full
fiscal and programmatic responsibility for special education, and has
“no link” to the local school district’s special education services.272
Such charter schools, however, remain responsible for evaluating the
kinds of services required by special needs students. This evaluation
carries with it the risk of having to educate a large number of “high
cost” students. Some “no link” states have developed programs to
reduce this risk. Indiana charter schools may join a cooperative that
provides special education support. 273 Ohio employs program
support run by governmental entities that provide all public schools
with special education services, called Educational Service Centers.274
Rhode Island requires charter schools to inform parents of “high
costs” students that they will have difficulty meeting the child’s needs,
and, in some cases, requires the school to pay for such a student’s
enrollment in a private school that provides adequate special
education services, if requested by the student’s parents. 275

271. See id. at 13. States with charter school laws often mix the three policies as a
part of a comprehensive charter school policy, depending on whether a charter school
may be chartered as a LEA. For example, if a California charter school organizes as
a LEA, then it is subject to “no link” provisions. If it does not organize as a LEA,
the charter school is governed on a “partial-link” basis. See PROJECT SEARCH, supra
note 259, at 13; see also Lauren M. Rhim & Margaret J. McLaughlin, Special
Education in American Charter Schools: State Level Policy, Practices and Tensions,
31 CAMBRIDGE J. EDUC. 373 (2001); see generally JULIE F. MEAD, PRIMERS ON
IMPLEMENTING SPECIAL EDUCATION IN CHARTER SCHOOLS, CHATER SCHOOLS
DESIGNED FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES: AN INITIAL EXAMINATION OF ISSUES
AND
QUESTIONS
RAISED
(2008),
http://www.uscharterschools.org/cs/spedp/query/q/2057
[https://perma.cc/UK9BW4AS] [hereinafter, PRIMERS ON IMPLEMENTING SPECIAL EDUCATION] (providing a
list of policies by state).
272. States that have adopted a “no link” statute include: Delaware, Indiana,
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Several states
provide that if a charter school organizes as an LEA, then it shall operate under “no
link” principles: Arizona, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and
Wisconsin. See PRIMERS ON IMPLEMENTING SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 271.
273. See IND. CODE § 20-35-5-1 et seq.; see also Jane Ammeson, Northwest Indiana
Special Education Cooperative Opens Doors for Children with Disabilities,
NORTHWEST IND. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nwitimes.com/niche/northwestindiana-special-education-cooperative-opens-doors-for-childrenwith/article_cd09d7f8-0682-5841-b895-d62cfc3ca1cd.html
[https://perma.cc/2T4V6Q75].
274. OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.843, § 3313.845. Educational Service Centers serve
multiple schools within a given district, including charter schools, and are funded
according to the funding levels of the schools they serve.
275. R.I.G.L. § 16-24-1; R. I. REGULATIONS § 300.131–§ 300.144.
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If a charter school is part of a LEA, usually the local school district,
then the fiscal and programmatic responsibilities may be provided
solely by the LEA (“total link”) or shared between the LEA and the
charter school (“partial link”). 276 In total link states, the LEA
(without the charter school) provides all special education services
and funding. Generally, total link states follow one of three models: a
strict oversight and control model, a contract model, or an insurance
model. 277 Under the strict oversight and control model, states such as
Hawaii and Kansas allocate per-pupil funds directly to the LEA, who
is then solely responsible for providing all special education services
directly to charter schools. 278 Strict oversight states often have highly
centralized education systems that protect charter schools from
incurring high special education costs. Under the contract model,
LEAs may contract special education services to the charter schools
who become de facto agents of the LEA. 279 The charter school is free
to hire special education teachers and provide services, but is also
directly accountable to the LEA’s director of special education for
state and federal compliance. 280 Finally, in some states, such as
Colorado, local education agencies employ the insurance model,
which requires charter schools to pay a flat per-pupil fee to districts in
order to insure against the possibility of having to educate a high-cost
student. 281 At the end of the school year, the local education agency
may return unused premiums or hold them in case of future deficits
for high cost special needs students. 282
In partial-link states, the charter school and LEA negotiate the
appropriate level of services and funding they will jointly provide.283
276. See PROJECT SEARCH, supra note 259, at 12.
277. See EILEEN M. AHEARN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT #1: STATE LEGISLATIVE
REVIEW 17 (2005) (Total Link only: Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas,
Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, Virginia, Wyoming; Total Link if not
LEA: Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Massachussetts, Michigan, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Wisconsin).
278. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302D-30 (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-3409
(West 2018).
279. PROJECT SEARCH, supra note 259, at 24.
280. Federal Policy 104: Oversight of Federal Funds in Charter Schools, NAT’L
ASS’N CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, https://www.qualitycharters.org/researchpolicies/archive/federal-policy-104-oversight-of-federal-funds-in-charter-schools/
[https://perma.cc/HXC7-M2GN].
281. PROJECT SEARCH, supra note 259, at 25.
282. Id.
283. Id. See PRIMERS ON IMPLEMENTING SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 271
(Partial-Link Only: Alaska, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Jersey, New York; Partial-Link if not LEA: Arizona, California, District of
Columbia, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah).

118

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

Such arrangements usually involve a mixture of special education
services provided by the LEA and the charter school, with the LEA
disbursing funds, minus administrative fees, to the charter school only
for services directly provided. 284 For example, in Florida, it is
common for a LEA to assign a liaison between the agency and the
charter schools within its boundaries; the liaison is responsible for
coordinating special services and maintaining all IEPs. 285 Similarly, in
Iowa, the charter school and LEA are required to coordinate with the
Area Education Agency with regards to special education services.286
Tennessee, in 2012, granted LEAs the authority to withhold
education funds to cover insurance and other retirement obligations,
or to withhold up to 1% of educational funds to cover services not
contracted from the local education agencies. 287 The partial-link
model provides charter schools some insurance from the high costs of
special needs education: charter schools who are unable to provide
certain expensive services may negotiate with a LEA, which
presumably has the infrastructure to take on a portion of those costs.
However, as discussed earlier, charter schools often lack bargaining
power in these negotiations, and so may be saddled with a larger
portion of the expenditures if they cannot provide the services
directly.
F.

Transportation

School transportation is one of the most contentious issues for
school budgets. Transportation is often a barrier for parents
attempting to exercise school choice, especially for low-income
families. 288 The transportation costs for charter schools are typically
higher than for local school districts, because the charter schools
typically draw students dispersed over a larger area. 289 States such as
PROJECT SEARCH, supra note 259, at 39.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 25.
See Regina Umpstead et al., Charter Schools and the Law: Current Issues in
U.S. Courts and Legislatures, 298 ED. LAW. REP. 657, 667 (2014) (citing TENN. CODE
ANN. § 49-13-101 et seq. (West 2013)).
288. See PAUL TESKE ET AL., CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., DRIVERS OF
CHOICE: PARENTS, TRANSPORTATION, AND SCHOOL CHOICE 24 (2009),
https://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/pub_dscr_teske_jul09_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T5YS-2YKX].
289. See generally Jon Valant & Jane Arnold Lincove, The Barriers that Make
Charter Schools Inaccessible to Disadvantaged Families, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 16,
2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2018/03/16/thebarriers-that-make-charter-schools-inaccessible-to-disadvantaged-families/
[https://perma.cc/QXS3-EEBL].
284.
285.
286.
287.
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Arizona and Delaware provide state transportation aid to charter
schools that are not chartered by a local school board. 290 California
law provides that charter schools are entitled to transportation
services by the local school district at no cost because if the students
attended a district public school, the district would bear the costs of
providing transportation anyway. 291 Other state enabling statutes do
not address transportation, leaving charter schools to negotiate with
local school districts for transportation services.
IV. PROPOSALS
The foregoing illustrates the intricate, difficult hurdles charter
schools face in their plight for equitable funding. Many states require
that funds go through an intermediary, often the hosting district, but
charter schools lack bargaining power against SEAs and LEAs. In
order to secure funds, states need to anchor public funds to a stable
public institution that has access to public debt markets. Lastly,
charter schools struggle the most at their beginnings, as they lack
sufficient start-up funds and adequate facilities. Charter schools have
unique financial needs and must rely on public assistance to preserve
the public character of the charter school movement.
A number of reforms, most at the state level, are necessary in order
to close the charter school funding gap. First, states should
strengthen charter school bargaining positions by revising their
charter school laws to provide specific guidance as to mandatory
funding levels and to remove provisions that hamstring charter
schools, such as “hold harmless” clauses. Second, states should
streamline the funding process and give charter schools greater
autonomy over their funds by allowing charter schools to organize as
their own LEA. Third, expanding the field and role of authorizers
will spur innovation in charter school models and will ease the
workload of overburdened state and local education agencies who
currently act as authorizers. Fourth, states should fund initiatives that
provide charter schools access to startup and facilities funding. Fifth,
states should rebalance their priorities when it comes to distributing
funds to charter schools; charter schools should be funded from the
same local sources as traditional public schools rather than relying on
state funds. Finally, charter schools should fight for equal funding on

290. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-185(D) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 508
(West 2018).
291. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 42238.03 (West 2018).
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their own behalf by pursuing litigation under their respective state’s
“adequate education” constitutional provisions.
A. Drafting Stronger Charter School Laws: Statutory Language,
Withholding Clauses, and Impact Aid
As discussed above, charter school statutes are often poorly
drafted, vague, and give little bargaining power to charter schools
who must negotiate with public school districts. 292 When states use
words such as “commensurate” or “equitable” to describe funding
levels with no particular definition, they give hosting school districts
the ability to define the terms to their advantage. Moreover, charter
school statutes often include “hold harmless” clauses, which permit
hosting school districts to withhold funds that should follow a student
if that student transfers to a charter school. 293 Such provisions
essentially force taxpayers to fund that student’s education twice —
once to the school district and again to the charter school. Further,
states provide “impact aid” to public schools to cushion the financial
blow from transferring students. 294 This often includes fees that
charter schools must pay to the district for services normally provided
on a non-fee basis, such as administrative or transportation
“reimbursements.” 295 These kinds of fee provisions not only cut into
the already slim funds charter schools rely on to provide education
programs, but they also give school districts the power to essentially
determine the financial viability of charter schools.
There are several amendments that ought to be made to charter
school statutes in order to level the playing field. First, charter school
statutes should specify the funding levels of charter schools and
provide clear parameters for charter-district negotiations. For
example, a statute could expressly dictate that charter schools should
receive an amount equal to the per-pupil expenditure on students in
all district public schools. Further, permissive language such as
“may” or “ought” should be replaced with mandatory language such
as “must” or “shall.” Studies suggest that charter schools in states
with enabling statutes that use stronger funding language receive an
average of 4% more funds than charter schools in states with weaker
language. 296 While these amendments may not ensure equal funding

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

See supra Section III.A.1.
See supra Section III.A.2.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Part III.
See supra Section III.A.
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to charter schools, specifying an amount will at least allow charter
schools to plan with a more accurate idea of the public funding they
will receive. Specific language will provide charter schools increased
access to legal recourse if a school district does not give the funding
specified in the statute.
Second, state legislatures should consider doing away with “hold
harmless” and “impact aid” provisions. School districts argue that
they have larger fixed costs, such as a collective bargaining agreement
with a teacher’s union, that prevent them from cutting costs as easily
as a charter school could. 297 But “hold harmless” and “impact aid”
provisions essentially let the school district shirk its responsibility to
subsidize the costs of students that attend charter schools, and stall
necessary systemic reform. It is widely accepted that the school
finance structures are moving toward a per-pupil model, which
require districts to realistically predict the number of children they
are likely to serve. 298 Eliminating a district’s perverse financial
incentives to fight against this reform would encourage better
educational outcomes and reduce the burden on taxpayers.
Third, state legislatures should consider enacting legislation that
penalizes school districts that withhold funds from charter schools, or
that exclude them from categorical aid programs intended for all
public schools within the district. This can be done in various ways.
For example, school districts that arbitrarily withhold money from
charter schools could be assessed a penalty by SEAs. Alternatively,
the statute could authorize a punitive damages award for charter
schools that pursue judicial remedy. These kinds of penalties would
give charter schools an advantage both in negotiating service
contracts with school districts and when enforcing the terms of these
contracts.
Finally, improving charter school access to non-profit credit and
public debt markets would start to even the playing field between
charter schools and traditional public-school districts. States can
provide legislative incentives, such as tax credits similar to those in
the NMTC, to lenders who invest capital in charter schools in certain
demographic areas. 299 This incentive would lead to more private
funds being used to construct and maintain new charter schools
without getting the school district involved. Similarly, states can act
to improve charter schools’ ability to raise funds at interest rates

297. See supra Section I.B.
298. See supra Section III.A.1.
299. See supra Section II.B.
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similar to those of public-school district tax-exempt bonds. This
would allow charter schools to more effectively compete with
traditional public-school districts. State legislatures could achieve this
goal in a number of ways, including enacting state-level credit
enhancement programs, whereby a charter school that meets certain
performance targets receives the state’s credit rating (either through a
guaranty or a subsidy) for purposes of obtaining capital financing.
Drafting stronger charter school laws that more clearly define
charter school funding levels and eliminate LEAs’ incentives or
excuses to withhold funds from charter schools would greatly reduce
the funding gap, by giving charter schools more negotiating power
and the ability to pursue legal remedies against non-compliant local
school boards.
B.

Improving Funds Flow: Local Education Agency Status

In order to equalize state and federal funding between charter
schools and public schools, state legislatures increasingly allow
charter schools or authorizers to organize as their own LEAs, rather
than organizing the charter school under the hosting school district.
A LEA receives federal funds directly from the state and is
responsible for administering these funds to schools. 300 The local
education agency is responsible for overseeing all activities funded by
federal dollars, to assure delivery of applicable services and inclusion
of qualified students, to provide training in compliance with federal
law, and to communicate with state and federal education units.301
LEA status is controlled by state law, twenty-five states currently
allow charter schools or their authorizers to organize as LEAs. 302
When a charter school gains LEA status, it can effectively cut out
the intermediary when receiving federal dollars that are properly
allocated to it. There are several benefits to this, both for the charter
school and the federal government. The charter school does not have
to negotiate with the hosting school district for federal money
properly allocated to it. Further, charter schools that have LEA
status are generally more autonomous and receive more money than
charter schools in states where they cannot organize as a LEA. For
the federal government, charter schools with LEA status have more
flexibility in administering federal funds, which allows them to

300. See supra Part III.
301. See supra Part III.
302. See CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33.

2019]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

123

innovate and improve delivery of services to at-risk youth under Title
I or special needs students under IDEA.
States have adopted several different models to grant LEA status
to charter schools. Some states allow charter schools to become fullfledged LEAs, which means they also assume all responsibility for
complying with federal guidelines. 303 These states also parcel out
state dollars according to LEA status, thus improving access to state
programs. Other states allow more flexibility for charter schools to
negotiate with host school district LEAs for some partial support,
diverting some of the administrative burdens to the district. 304 New
York grants limited local education agency status to charter schools,
which allows them to apply only for federal funds. 305 Regardless of
the model, when charter schools can gain LEA status they can
compete with the hosting district and recoup the funds that would
have been withheld to cover administrative costs.
With LEA status, however, comes the burdens of reporting to state
and federal education units. 306 Education reporting requirements are
notoriously difficult to manage and often require a specialist to
organize the data and deadlines for a particular school. Single charter
schools are at a significant disadvantage because they often lack the
expertise to comply with reporting requirements on their own, but do
not have the budget to hire a specialist. Additionally, single charter
schools do not enjoy the economy of scale of a large school district
that oversees dozens of schools. Even if a charter school hires a
specialist, the money would likely come out of operational funding at
the expense of education programming.
That said, by becoming their own LEAs charter schools can
eliminate the inefficient education bureaucracies attached to large
school districts and create more efficient ways for single schools to
manage reporting requirements. Charter schools might also find that
contracting with a private company that manages the reporting
requirements for several charter schools is more cost-efficient than
having contracted with the host school district to do so. This supports
the education reform goals of charter schools, because bureaucracies
often stifle innovation and create more overhead, which inevitably
has a detrimental impact on student achievement.

303.
304.
305.
306.
1802.

Id. at 12.
See supra Part IV.
See CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33, at 62.
See, e.g., Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-95 § 1413, 129 Stat.
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Another problem with charter schools acting as LEAs is that they
balkanize the education finance landscape, creating autonomous
agencies within larger school districts. Increasing the number of
LEAs in the state necessarily increases the administrative burden on
SEAs to monitor them for compliance. While an audit of a single
school LEA takes less time than auditing a large school district, the
initial audit by an intermediary (a school district) would be missing.
In some states, authorizers perform this intermediary audit, but these
powers are often relatively weak compared to a state regulatory
authority.
The concept of charter schools as LEAs is an easy fix for improving
the flow of federal funds, but it does not work for all state charter
school schemes. Many states, such as Massachusetts, allow only the
SEA to charter a new school. 307 In those states, the advantages of
allowing the charter school to organize as a LEA would be nil,
because the school already receives its federal and state funds directly
from the state. In addition, several states allow only local school
districts to charter new schools. 308 LEA status for charter schools in
these states would have benefits, but the local school district would
never allow it, as it has a vested interest in collecting administrative
fees. Charter school LEAs would work best in states that allow for
different kinds of non-district authorizers, because this would give the
charter school financial and programmatic control in federal
programs while preserving some level of oversight to the authorizer.
This reform, of encouraging multiple and alternative authorizers, is
discussed below.
C.

Strengthening the Role of Authorizers

As the intermediary between state education agencies and charter
schools, authorizers are in a unique and pivotal position. As
previously discussed, SEAs and local education boards often make
poor authorizers: state agencies are generally overburdened and local
education boards have a vested interest in withholding funds from
Allowing more diversity in the kinds of
charter schools. 309
authorizers would promote a competitive market for authorizers, and
generate more efficient and innovative methods of evaluating charter
school progress. 310 Moreover, alternative authorizers may act as de-

307.
308.
309.
310.

50-State Comparison, supra note 56.
Id.
See Section II.A.
See CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS, supra note 33, at 5.
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facto school boards for charter schools, and state legislatures could
empower authorizers to administer categorical grants and state aid
directly to charter schools. As the entities responsible for monitoring
charter school progress, authorizers are in the best position to
determine whether the money that charter school received has been
effectively spent. In essence, the authorizer would act as the LEA for
the charter schools it oversees.
There are several other advantages to having a more diverse
authorizer pool. First, like charter school LEAs, an alternative
authorizer would prohibit the local school district from arbitrarily
withholding funds, thereby improving the flow of funds to charter
schools. Second, authorizers have the distinct advantage of being
able to create a more efficient system to manage federal and state
compliance because they already serve in a monitoring role for a host
of charter schools but are not themselves responsible for reaching
educational outcomes. Third, authorizers typically have greater
access to institutional resources to assist charter schools in meeting
educational, financial, and managerial targets.
Most states, in lieu of allowing alternative authorizers, allow local
school boards to retain control over the funds but require that the
authorizer monitor the charter school’s progress. This separation of
control not only exacerbates the funding inequities between charter
schools and public schools, it does not allow the authorizer to
adequately gauge the effectiveness of a particular charter school
model because the school itself is underfunded. A better solution
would be to allow the authorizer to control both the monitoring and
financial aspects of the charter school as a disinterested third party.
Elevating the role of authorizers to monitor funds may have some
unintended consequences. Rather than creating innovative financing
and accountability measures, the authorizers may simply fall back on
traditional methods used by public school districts, which will only
maintain the status quo. Furthermore, many authorizers, such as
private universities and non-profit organizations, lack public
accountability. While it is true that charter schools themselves remain
accountable to the parents, who can remove their children from the
school, there will be ineffective oversight of authorizers as a group if
the state fails to regulate authorizer activity.
Despite these
challenges, granting authorizers the power to become, in effect, a
LEA would likely improve funding equity and allow charter schools
to thrive.

126

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

D. Categorical Grants: Start-Up and Facilities Funds
Studies examining barriers to emerging charter schools repeatedly
find that one of the main hurdles preventing new charter schools from
forming is lack of start-up and facilities funds. 311 These are unique
funding challenges for charter schools that public schools typically do
not have to worry about. Even assuming that charter schools receive
equal funding, those funds are intended to maintain an educational
program, not start a new one or pay for rent and facilities
maintenance. As discussed above, many charter school organizations
are sponsored by for-profit or non-profit entities that provide seed
money to start the school and find a suitable building.312
Additionally, authorizers typically compete for these programs in
order to open charter schools in their districts because of their
reputation for success. 313 The charter schools that are left out are
smaller, community-based schools that often have the most
innovative models for reaching at-risk students. These localized
charter schools rely heavily on private donors or corporations for
funds. 314 As discussed, there are a variety of methods that states can
adopt to provide start-up funds and facilities access. What is essential
is that state legislatures allocate state tax revenue to these initiatives
rather than leave them underfunded.
E.

Allow Local School Tax Revenues to Flow to Charter Schools

The majority of public-school funding comes from local property
and sales taxes, yet the majority of charter school funding comes from
state aid. 315 This likely reflects a political balance within particular
states — state legislatures favor charter schools and local school
communities (and school districts) resist them. Yet, in order for
charter schools to fairly compete with public schools, they need to
have access to the same amount of funding, regardless of the source.

311.
312.
313.
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315.

See supra Section III.B.2.
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See supra Section II.B.
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Litigate Under State Charter School Authorization Laws and
State Constitutions

Since 2007, there has been a movement of charter schools seeking
Beginning with
equal funding through the court system. 316
Maryland 317 and seen recently in North Carolina 318 and Texas,319
some charter schools sue their authorizers and LEAs to receive the
same funding as traditional public schools. These suits rely on
language in state constitutions providing for “adequate” education, or
on statutory language that expressly or impliedly requires
commensurate or proportional funding between traditional public
schools and charter schools. 320 These lawsuits have had mixed
success, with charter schools in Maryland and North Carolina
prevailing 321 and charter schools in New Jersey and Texas failing in
their endeavors. 322
Interestingly, the Texas Supreme Court rejected a challenge
brought by a charter school under the “adequacy” clause of the Texas
state constitution because, in the court’s view, the Texas constitution
did not require “adequate” funding to achieve the “general diffusion
of knowledge.” 323 The court reasoned that educational spending does
not necessarily determine the adequacy of an education, so judicial
mandates that the legislature allocate specific amounts of money are
inappropriate. 324 This proposition, however, is known to be untrue —
funding for education, especially when related to facilities and special
services, is critical to providing an adequate education.
As states revisit their charter school laws and debates around the
merits of the school choice movements continue, public policy
discussions surrounding equal funding for charter schools and
316. See Jeanette M. Curtis, Note, A Fighting Chance: Inequities in Charter School
Funding and Strategies for Achieving Equal Access to Public School Funds, 55 HOW.

L.J. 1057, 1076 (2012).
317. See Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs v. City Neighbors Charter Sch., 929 A.2d
113, 131–32 (Md. 2007).
318. See Sugar Creek Charter Sch., Inc. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
673 S.E.2d 667, 669 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
319. See Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex.
2016).
320. See City Neighbors, 929 A.2d at 131; Sugar Creek, 673 S.E.2d at 669; Morath,
490 S.W.3d at 850.
321. See City Neighbors, 929 A.2d at 131–32; see generally Sugar Creek, 673 S.E.2d
667.
322. See generally J.D. ex rel. Scipio-Derrick v. Davy, 2 A.3d 387, 393 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2010); Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 850–51.
323. See Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 849–50; see also TEX. CONST. art. 7, § 1.
324. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 850–51.
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traditional public schools, along with equal funding litigation, will
surely continue. Adopting the proposals above will give charter
schools a better bargaining position vis-à-vis traditional public schools
when negotiating for their share of federal, state, and local funding,
and will improve the flow of funds from these sources to charter
schools. Additionally, these proposals will, if adopted, broadly
change the education finance landscape, as charter schools would be
funded at levels similar to traditional public schools. This increased
funding will allow charter schools to effectively compete with — and
continue to innovate — the educational sphere, which can translate
into better outcomes for students, families, and even school districts.
CONCLUSION
The charter school movement represents a new hope for equal
opportunity to receive a quality education.
Charter schools
themselves are places of instructional and managerial innovation, and
the process of creating a charter school, with its layers of oversight
between authorizers, state education agencies, and local school
districts, is a mold-breaking reform in governance. But the charter
school movement is relatively young, especially when compared with
the traditional public-school model. States, school districts, and
charter schools are only now discovering how to structure rules,
regulations, and controls in order to make the charter school formula
successful.
Advocates from all ends of the political spectrum seem to agree
with this basic proposition: charter schools should receive the same
funding as traditional public schools. This premise is grounded in the
original ethos that inspired the charter school movement — that
small, independent schools could do more with the money they
receive from the government because they would not be hindered by
the bureaucratic red-tape that prevents traditional public schools
from pursuing innovative ideas. Providing equal funding to charter
schools will place them on even footing with traditional public
schools, which will give parents more choices in what school is best
for their child. This, in theory, will force the public education
bureaucracy to change. However, as this Article describes, charter
schools are woefully and purposefully underfunded, inhibiting the
market from truly reforming public education.
Furthermore, denying charter schools equal funding inhibits public
schools and charter schools from advocating together for greater
investment in America’s schools and communities. Rather than
taking money away from traditional public schools, charter schools
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actually increase overall investment in education by tapping into
outside sources of funding to supplement public education.
Equalizing funding will enhance overall investment of both private
and public dollars in education, which will allow charter schools and
public-school districts to come together to advocate for greater
government investment in schools. The broad solution to this
problem is to reform state charter school laws so they provide equal
funding for charter schools. Practically, this solution will play out
differently in each state, as laws must be tailored to the state and local
context in which the charter school will function.
Money alone will not raise achievement in public or charter
schools. More than anything else, public and charter schools need
dedicated, quality educators and school leaders to teach, inspire, and
motivate students to reach their potential. But research has shown
that every student is different. Thus, in order to promote students’
growth into the citizens of tomorrow, innovative and different
educational environments need to be created. Funding plays a critical
role in creating these innovative contexts in charter schools.

